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Abstract
In the wake of the sexual abuse of young boys being revealed to the public in November
2011, the Penn State community was launched into the forefront of public attention. Loyal Penn
Staters were obviously shaken by the news, reacting in a manner consistent with trauma or crisis
response. Select subgroups of those affiliated with Penn State, including fans, students, the
Paterno family, and local retail business owners, employed many defense mechanisms in
responding to the scandal. The defense mechanisms employed by Penn Staters included, but
were not limited to, simple denial, appeals to the inherent morality of Penn State (and its football
program), self-victimization, focus on icons, and the elimination of Sandusky’s true victims from
public consciousness. Further, hegemonic institutional ideology played a distinct role in
conditioning the behavior of these “insider collectives” in the wake of the scandal. The need for
the PSU community to protect normalized conceptions of acceptable masculinity in a football
setting, as well as the financial well-being of the community (capitalist interests), played a
significant role in motivating the inability to acknowledge the true victims of the scandal: the
boys. The group dynamics that were clearly at play in Happy Valley involved a subconscious
public rejection of the psychological splitting required to authentically and effectively interrogate
these group dynamics and their silencing effect. Thus, identification with Penn State University
and its football program played an integral role in determining crisis response.

xi
In contrast to these Penn State insider subgroups, outside observers of the scandal reacted
much differently to Sandusky’s transgressions and the subsequent cover-up by Penn State
coaches and administrators. These groups, which include the NCAA, outside journalistic
observers (not affiliated with the university), and Louis Freeh (who was commissioned by Penn
State to conduct an investigation into the cover-up of Sandusky’s assaults), demonstrated a
willingness to criticize Penn State fans and students for their responses to the scandal, shed light
on the corruption within the Penn State administration (and coaching staff), and acknowledged
the victimized boys. These outside observers also interrogated the institutional habits that
allowed the long-term enabling of sexual abuse within the Penn State football program.
The Catholic Archdiocese of Boston and the University of North Carolina encountered
scandals of their own in the early 2000’s and 2010 respectively. The Catholic Archdiocese of
Boston had been involved in decades of cover-up regarding clergymen sexually abusing minors.
In Chapel Hill, the UNC Athletic Department came under fire for a high number of student
athletes (mostly football and men’s basketball players) getting involved in fake classes in order
to retain their eligibility. While these scandals are unique in many ways, they each possess
characteristics that overlap with the situation at Penn State in 2011, as the Archdiocese of
Boston’s scandal also involved sexual abuse (and notions of “appropriate” sexuality) and the
University of North Carolina’s saga also dealt with the implication of a major athletic program.
By engaging in comparative analysis of these three events, many commonalities can be observed
in public response to them, including denial, scapegoating, self-victimization, and silencing of
threatening discourse. Those affiliated with the Archdiocese of Boston and the University of
North Carolina utilized many of the same defense mechanisms as insider groups at Penn State.
Thus, it can be seen that similar group dynamics and identity politics have the ability to

xii
contextually condition individual behavior (insider populations not responding to criminal
activity in the same way as they would if an institution they did not identify with were under
fire).
This comparative analysis proves that members of institutions, as well as their leaders,
will go to great lengths to preserve the reputation of their community when exposed to “crisis”
situations. These same actors employ the same rhetorical and psychological defense mechanisms
regardless of institutional context. These similarities also prove that the pristine conceptions of
masculinity, capitalism, and institutional image are consistently prioritized over the lives and
traumas of victims of scandal or institutional betrayal. Thus, the responses to any institutional
scandal are predictable, although, at first glance, they may seem unique and “subjective.” This
thesis also effectively demonstrates how the behavior of seemingly independent-minded
individuals is governed by the dominant ideology of the institutions they identify with.
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Fig. 1. Beaver Stadium During a “White Out” Game (Image Courtesy of Sports Illustrated)

INTRODUCTION

FACTS AND ICONS

Before We Begin

On November 5, 2011, Pennsylvania State University and the larger United States
community was made aware of a long-term child abuse scandal involving former Nittany
Lion assistant football coach, Gerald A. “Jerry” Sandusky. 1 After Sandusky’s arrest that

1

Sandusky was found guilty on various charges relating to the sexual assault of 10 boys, but several others
(no official number) came forward following the publication of two phone numbers for victims to call
should they want to report personal accounts of Sandusky’s abuse. The abuse Sandusky was criminally
charged for is reported to date back to around 1996 (according to Victim 7). This information comes
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day, a firestorm of media coverage, university action, student activism, and outside
investigation was unleashed on Happy Valley. In the end, it was not only Sandusky who
was punished for his crimes, but also several Penn State administrators and the
university’s legendary head football coach, Joe Paterno, who faced sanctions and
termination. These consequences were due in large part to corruption within the Penn
State administration and football program, as senior administrators and coaches took part
in an intricate cover-up of Sandusky’s crimes for years. In the weeks following
Sandusky’s arrest, student gatherings were held around campus; Sandusky’s
organization, The Second Mile, was dissolved; Tim Curley, Gary Schultz, Graham
Spanier and Joe Paterno all either stepped down from their roles at the university, were
not rehired when their contract expired or were fired; and PSU launched a massive
investigation, led by former FBI Director Louis Freeh, into the misconduct of all
involved. Prior to any analysis of the Sandusky scandal, it is necessary to present a brief
summary of the scandal’s constituent events and characters.

courtesy of Tony Manfred’s, “The Number of Potential Victims in the Penn State Scandal Has Doubled in
the Last 24 Hours.”

3
A Timeline of Events:

Table One. Timeline of Significant Events in Sandusky Scandal (Adapted from Louis
Freeh’s Investigative Report and CNN’s Sandusky Scandal “Fast Facts”)

DATE

EVENT

May 3, 1998

·

Sandusky assaults Victim 6 in showers of Lasch Building

May 4, 1998

·

Mother of Victim 6 reports assault and police begin investigation

May 1998

·
Schultz opens communication with Spanier and Curley regarding
incident (Paterno also conveys nervousness in talks with Curley)
·
University police decide not to write entry in crime log due to
insufficient evidence of crime
·
Spanier does not notify Board of Trustees about investigation of
Sandusky

June 1998

·

District Attorney declines bringing charges against Sandusky

·
University police meet with Sandusky and determine that nothing
criminal took place (Sandusky admits to “hugging” the victim)
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August 1999

·
Sandusky granted emeritus rank at university following
retirement (allowed special access to facilities, etc.)

December
1999

·
Sandusky brings Victim 4 to Alamo Bowl and assaults him at
team hotel

November
2000

·

Victim 8 assaulted by Sandusky in Lasch building

·
Assault witnessed by janitor but not reported (janitor feared
losing job)

February 9,
2001

February 1012, 2001

·

Sandusky assaults Victim 2 in Lasch Building showers

·

McQueary witnesses assault

·

Feb. 10: McQueary reports incident to Paterno

·

Feb. 11: Paterno informs Curley and Schultz of report

·
Feb. 12: Spanier, Schultz, and Curley meet regarding the report,
review events of 1998 (including asking University Police
Department Chief Harmon if 1998 incident is still on file)

Feb. 25-26,
2001

·
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley meet to devise action plan (which
includes telling Sandusky to avoid bringing children into facilities
and filing a report with the Department of Welfare)
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Feb. 27-28,
2001

·
Curley decides matter should be handled internally by speaking
with Sandusky and offering professional help (Curley proposes going
to officials at the Second Mile charity organization and Department of
Welfare only if Sandusky is not cooperative)
·

Spanier and Schultz agree to the changed plan of action

March 5, 2001 ·
Curley meets with Sandusky to mention that he should no longer
bring boys into athletic facilities and that Penn State administration
was “uncomfortable” about the incident

March 16-19,
2001

·
Mar. 16: Spanier does not make mention of incident at Board of
Trustees meeting
·
Mar. 19: Curley meets with executive director of Second Mile
and “shared information” regarding the incident, but Second Mile
leadership deemed it a “non-incident”

August 2001

·

Victim 5 assaulted in Lasch Building shower by Sandusky

September 21, ·
Neither Spanier nor Schultz disclose any information regarding
2001
Sandusky at Board of Trustees meeting
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January 7,
2010

·
Subpoenas issued to PSU by Pennsylvania Attorney General for
personnel records and correspondences with Sandusky

January 12,
2011

·

Schultz, Paterno, and Curley testify before the Grand Jury

April 13, 2011

·

Spanier appears before the Grand Jury

·
One PSU Trustee continues a correspondence with Spanier
requesting that the Board be briefed about the details of the Sandusky
investigation

May 12, 2011

·
Spanier and then-Penn State General Counsel Cynthia Baldwin
discuss status of the Sandusky investigation with Board of Trustees at
Board meeting (with importance of investigation downplayed)
·
Spanier and Baldwin do not update the Board on the ongoing
Sandusky investigation at the following two Board meetings (the
Board no longer asks about the investigation)
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November 4,
2011

·
After being contacted by Wendell Courtney regarding a
newspaper story about the Sandusky charges, Schultz mentions that
he “was never aware that ‘Penn State police investigated
inappropriate touching in a shower’ in 1998”
·

Criminal charges filed against Sandusky in Centre County

·
Criminal charges filed against Schultz and Curley in Dauphin
County

November 5,
2011

·

Sandusky is arrested

·
Grand Jury presentment released mentioning that no attempt was
made to protect Victim 2 or any other children from similar conduct
of Sandusky’s
·
Spanier issues press release expressing “unconditional support”
for Schultz and Curley (only mentions child victims by stating that
“Protecting children requires the utmost vigilance.”)

November 6,
2011

·
At Board of Trustees meeting, Curley is placed on administrative
leave and Schultz retires (for second time in career)
·
Tension arises between Spanier and Board of Trustees as Spanier
mentions in press release that Schultz and Curley voluntarily changed
their employment status (Trustees upset with tone of press release)
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November 7,
2011

·
Pennsylvania Attorney General and Pennsylvania State Police
Commissioner announce charges against Sandusky, Schultz and
Curley

November 9,
2011

·
After announcing their “outrage” at the “horrifying details” of the
Grand Jury presentment, Board of Trustees removes Spanier as
President (Rodney Erickson named Interim President) and removes
Paterno as Head Football Coach
·

Paterno notified over the phone of the Board’s decision

·

Board holds press conference announcing its actions

·
Penn State students demonstrate in protest on Penn State campus
and in downtown State College

November 11,
2011

·

Mike McQueary placed on administrative leave

November 14,
2011

·
Sandusky asserts his innocence in a phone interview with Bob
Costas claiming that all he did wrong was “showering with those
kids”

9
November 16,
2011

·
Penn State University and State College Police representatives
mention that they have no record of receiving a report from
McQueary about his witnessing a rape
·
New judge assigned to the Sandusky case after it is discovered
that Leslie Dutchcot (the judge who freed Sandusky on $100,000 bail)
formerly volunteered for The Second Mile

November 21,
2011

·
It is announced that Louis Freeh will head an independent
investigation for PSU in regard to the administrative responses to
alleged child abuse

December 8,
2011

·
After being arrested on additional charges of rape (bringing
victim total from eight to ten) one day earlier, Sandusky is released on
$250,000 bail and placed under house arrest

January 22,
2012

·

Former Penn State head coach, Joe Paterno, dies at 85

June 11, 2012

·

The trial begins

June 22, 2012

·
Sandusky is found guilty on 45 counts and has his bail
immediately revoked
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July 12, 2012

·
Louis Freeh publishes a report detailing his findings regarding
Penn State’s actions in response to Sandusky’s abuse

July 23, 2012

·
The NCAA announces sanctions for Penn State University based
on findings of Freeh Report
·
Sanctions include: $60 million fine to Penn State, a four-year
postseason ban on football, loss of 20 football scholarships per year
for four seasons, and the immediate vacating of all Nittany Lion wins
in football from 1998 – 2011
·
Big Ten Conference announces that Penn State’s share of bowl
revenue for the next four years (roughly $13 million) will be donated
to organizations working to prevent child abuse

October 2,
2012

·

McQueary files whistleblower lawsuit against Penn State

November
2012 – July
2013

·
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley face charges regarding cover-up of
Sandusky scandal (for example, endangering the welfare of children)
and obstruction of justice

September 8,
2014

·
NCAA lifts Penn State’s postseason ban and scholarship
limitations
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January 16,
2015

·
NCAA agrees to restore 111 of Joe Paterno’s wins as a Penn
State football coach

·
Panel of judges reverse charges against Spanier, Curley, and
Schultz regarding obstruction of justice and conspiracy
·

Same panel reverses perjury charges for Spanier and Curley

May – July
2016

·
Another alleged victim comes forward with claims of being
assaulted by Sandusky in 1971 and subsequently ignored by Coach
Paterno because he “had a football season to prepare for”

March 13,
2017

·
Curley and Schultz plead guilty to misdemeanor charges of
endangering child welfare in exchange for other felony charges being
dropped

June 2, 2017

·
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley all sentenced for failing to report
the 2001 allegations of sexual assault to the proper authorities
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Thesis Goals and Scholarly Context

Although much has been said in the media and elsewhere about the events of the
scandal, there has been little study of the cultural and institutional factors that shaped the
cover-up and the PSU community’s response to it. This thesis will first analyze the very
different responses to the Sandusky scandal inside and outside the PSU community. It
will examine the primary documents associated with this response to chart how the PSU
football team and the university community positioned themselves as the victims of
Sandusky’s crimes rather than its enablers. While the sexual abuse itself was universally
condemned, this thesis will analyze how the sharply polarized responses to its
consequences were shaped by the tribal loyalties, fiscal realities, and gender/sexuality
dynamics that underlie American culture and, more specifically, football culture. These
forces will all be addressed in the second chapter of the thesis. To contextualize this
incident, the third chapter will compare the PSU football scandal to both the Archdiocese
of Boston’s response to sexual abuse charges against its priests and the academic
dishonesty scandal surrounding the University of North Carolina men’s basketball team
from 2011 to the present. Thus, the thesis will show how the seemingly spontaneous
individual responses to the Sandusky scandal were heavily conditioned by political,
economic, institutional, and gendered norms that pervade American culture.
Little academic analysis currently exists of the forces that enabled the collective
displacement of Sandusky's victims and their replacement by Paterno and the PSU
football program as the 'real victims' of the Sandusky affair. Within the State College
community, the events have been so repressed that, even now, individuals are unwilling
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to see PSU or Paterno as guilty of crimes. By using the tools developed in the academic
fields of oral history, economics, psychology, and gender/sexuality studies, this thesis
will show how seemingly spontaneous responses to a contingent situation are shaped by
powerful cultural forces.
This work leads to several conclusions. By looking at the details of the cover-up
specifically, the power of culture and institution in controlling individual behavior will be
explored. Individuals at PSU would have behaved very differently had their football
program or university not been in danger. This same concept also shows the larger
cultural frameworks of Penn State and its football program taking precedence over the
lives and trauma of individual victims. Additionally, the thesis will show how
institutional allegiances have a role in shaping reactions to transgressions by showing the
PSU community reacting to the scandal differently than they would have had it taken
place somewhere else. This result is due to the implications of attacks to iconic
figures/institutions and the disruptive power of the challenges to heteronormativity. By
looking at discrepancies between reactions to the Sandusky scandal and its cover-up
inside and outside the Penn State community, I will show just how vulnerable ethical
standards are to commercial, community-based, and broader cultural pressures.

Literature Review:

Both the events and aftermath of the Sandusky child abuse scandal have been well
documented. Thorough accounts of the scandal and its implications have been published
in book (Moushey & Dvorchak 2012) and documentary film (Bar Lev 2014) form. Each
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of these texts give their audiences an intimate understanding of the sequence of events
that led to Sandusky’s abuses and their cover-up by the Penn State administration. In
addition, they present the reactions of insider and outsider factions following critical
turning points in the saga including, but not limited to, Joe Paterno’s dismissal, the
publication of the Freeh report, and the announcement of NCAA sanctions against Penn
State University. These accounts will be the foundation for all factual observations in this
thesis.
Apart from analysis of the psychology of individual actors, group dynamics
(including the silencing of non-dominant ideology and opinions) involving leaders,
followers, and a specific environment/context all played a key role in allowing for
Sandusky’s transgressions to go unreported for so long (Thoroughgood & Padilla 2013).
Community interaction also played a key role in promoting a culture of victim
misidentification (as inappropriate stand-ins for the role of victim that rightfully belonged
to the children assaulted by Sandusky were popularized) and criticism of those with
negative perceptions of the university and its football program. In past years, groups that
have been taken on as analytical subjects pertinent to the scandal itself include children's
families and high school coaches, the Penn State football coaching staff, the Penn State
senior administration, the Penn State Board of Trustees, the Second Mile charitable
organization, the Centre County Pennsylvania criminal justice system, Penn State
students, the Big 10 athletic conference, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(Alderfer 2012). Beyond the silencing effect of group dynamics when it came to initial
decisions regarding reports of Sandusky’s crimes, the flawed attempts at breaking this
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silence have also been studied. In particular, euphemistic reporting language of Penn
State administrators and coaches (Paterno, McQueary, etc.) has been pinpointed as one of
the greatest contributing factors to Sandusky’s assaults going unnoticed for over a
decade. As reports of Sandusky’s sexual assaults were passed up the chain of command,
the actual crimes themselves became further shrouded in increasingly vague language, as
Penn State officials were not only uncomfortable with the nature of the abuses
themselves, but also may have been attempting to protect themselves and their football
program (Lucas & Fyke 2013). Manipulative language is not the only factor helping to
facilitate the cover-up that has been addressed, as the high status of the scandal’s indirect
perpetrators, specifically Joe Paterno, may have inadvertently enabled the cover-up of
Sandusky’s assaults (Wiley & Dahling 2013). By identifying some of the causes of
Sandusky’s actions being hidden from the public and law enforcement, scholars
frequently mention a desire to help prevent similar situations from happening in the
future. In fact, ways of adjusting Penn State’s culture itself (for example, increased
feminist ethic) have also been looked to in scholarly discourse as factors that could have
led to the scandal and its cover-up being avoided entirely by the university or at least
mitigated instances of institutional betrayal (Dowler, Cuomo, & Laliberte 2014).
Little work has been done on the range of responses to the scandal itself following
its emergence into national consciousness. Beyond the mainstream media, the analysis of
social media posts made by those who identify as Penn State fans (Brown, Brown, &
Billings 2013) as well as individuals who are employed as sports journalists (Sanderson
& Hambrick 2012) allows a clearer picture of collective response to the scandal and its
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subsequent consequences. These authors’ classification of particular psychological tactics
and defense mechanisms put into play by fans and members of the sports media has
provided a starting point for portions of this thesis. As mentioned above, reactions of the
local community have also been recorded in several non-academic publications such as
Amir Bar Lev’s 2014 documentary, Happy Valley. What Bar Lev captures on screen in
terms of PSU student and fan reaction has also been investigated, as several scholars have
been intrigued by the notion of attachment to Penn State University motivating a
particular response to the scandal (Bailey & Ferguson 2013).
This thesis will rely on much of this past work as a springboard for more nuanced
understanding of the scandal as it relates to group dynamics and psychology. In doing so,
it will move beyond mere descriptions of the scandal itself and reactions to it. Following
a classification of distinct responses to news of the scandal by inside and outside factions
respectively, I plan to analyze the culturally-constructed psychological forces that clearly
played a role in conditioning not only the cover-up itself, but responses to it. While
several scholars have described how the importance of Penn State’s football program and
the reverence for some of its key figures may have done this, my thesis will use
economics, siege mentality theory, as well as gender and sexuality theory to rationalize
the responses. Gender and sexuality theory will be included for its ability to demonstrate
how hegemonic constructions of masculinity in an athletic context led individuals
connected to Penn State to ignore the specific details of Sandusky’s assaults. One result
of this tendency was the elimination of the abused boys from public consciousness. In
addition, the comparative nature of my thesis begins in the familiar territory of comparing
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undergraduate institutions with prestigious athletic programs (Giroux & Giroux 2012)
and begins to link the Penn State scandal with the child abuse scandal which took place in
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston. By situating the 2011 Penn State child abuse
scandal in a broader conversation of group dynamics, my thesis will help to define the
predictability of the behavior of Penn State community members.
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Fig. 2. Penn State Students Celebrate After Toppling WJAC News Van (Image Courtesy of Dave Cole)

CHAPTER ONE

NOT-SO-HAPPY VALLEY
Spectacles draw the attention of people. It’s like a conjuror’s trick. When you create one
that is so powerful that it brings everybody out of the woodwork once a week, what
happens then is people aren’t looking around them. The rest of life is going on and
they’re not paying attention.
Penn State film professor Matthew Jordan, Happy Valley

Classification of Verbal and Nonverbal Rhetoric

The discursive fallout from the Sandusky scandal manifests a significant
mismatch in the reactions inside and outside Happy Valley. In this chapter, this
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difference will be detailed by looking specifically at the words and actions of individuals
who can be positioned as “insiders” and “outsiders” based on their affiliation with Penn
State University. Subgroups of the Penn State community, including fans, students, and
local retail business owners most often used their voices to speak out against “outsiders”
who were critical of Joe Paterno and the Penn State football program in general. These
same subgroups could be seen employing several different psychological defense
mechanisms in the wake of the scandal (including simple denial, incorporation, reminder,
self-victimization, etc.). Subgroups of the larger community having no affiliation to Penn
State had remarkably different reactions to the Sandusky scandal. For the purposes of this
investigation, the Freeh report, the NCAA, and non-local media will serve as
representatives of these “outsider” subgroups. These groups proved through their rhetoric
that they were much more willing to criticize Penn State administrators, students, fans,
and coaches, as well as investigate the underlying group dynamics that led to the coverup and “insensitive” reactions of the Penn Staters. While these factions are often
understood as more objective observers of the scandal, because they are not identified
with the university, they also covered the scandal unevenly (for example, scapegoating
incorporated into opinion pieces). In this section, not only words themselves, but also
performances and rhetorical strategies employed by insiders and outsiders serve as
evidence for the divide in perception of the Sandusky scandal and its cover-up by Penn
State leadership. Showing this divide will help to prove that an individual’s affiliation, or
lack thereof, with an institution plays an integral role in governing their seemingly
independent behavior.
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There were no entirely uniform opinions on the events of the scandal in any of the
relevant groups, internal or external. Each subgroup analyzed below had its dissenters, or
members who presented perspectives antithetical to the dominant collective view.
However, there is a strong tendency for such groups to intentionally repress these
dissenting opinions and keep them from the spotlight. Often, the better represented
members of a subgroup were successful in silencing contrary voices leaving only the
hegemonic or governing discourse. Therefore, while it is critical to compare the
predominant messages of inside and outside groups following news of Sandusky’s
transgressions and Penn State being reprimanded, it can be just as important to analyze
the conflicts within collectives.

Select Insider Perspectives

Penn State Student Body and Fan Base:

By far the most vocal and expressive insider factions during the aftermath of the
Penn State child abuse scandal were the Penn State student body and the fan base of the
university’s football team. Although these two groups do not necessarily overlap
perfectly, as not all students are fans of PSU football and not all PSU football fans are
students or alumni of PSU, they share sufficient overlap to be handled in tandem. The
dominant attitudes displayed by Penn State students and fans alike can be classified into
several distinct categories. The most common means of expression for this subsection of
Happy Valley’s insiders was a passionate idolatry focused on Joe Paterno. These
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individuals expressed love and concern for the legendary coach following announcements
of the assaults and cover-up in State College.2 This near-worship for “JoePa” even
generated the common use of denial as a defense mechanism. Apart from this, many
others engaged in scapegoating tactics, choosing to direct intense hatred and
disappointment at Jerry Sandusky, Penn State administrators (apart from Joe Paterno),
and the NCAA (following the sanctions handed down by President Emmert). Others
chose to divorce themselves from the scandal even further than this by promoting a more
positive perception of Penn State in broader communities.
An understanding of Paterno’s role in the State College and college football
community is vital to comprehension of student and fan sentiment. Within Happy Valley,
or even Pennsylvania more broadly, Paterno had grown over the years into a highly
mythologized individual, iconic for his emphasis on “doing things the right way.”
Beyond his staggering accomplishments as a head football coach at Penn State (which
include putting Penn State football on the map in terms of big-time college football, 409
total victories at the helm, two national championships, and twenty-four total bowl
victories), Paterno was always known for his personal integrity (Bar-Lev 2014). In fact,
Paterno’s emphasis on ensuring academic success and character growth for all of his
players was well documented during his tenure (Bar-Lev 2014). It is this attitude of
Paterno’s that his role was about more than winning games that earned him nicknames
like “Saint Joe” and the “Beacon of Integrity.” Paterno was also responsible for donating
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millions of dollars to the university during his lifetime.3 Beyond his role as a coach,
mentor, and father figure to his players, Paterno was also revered by Nittany Lion fans
for remaining loyal to his university by turning down a lucrative offer to join the
coaching staff of the NFL’s New England Patriots. According to Jerry Sandusky’s own
adopted son, Matthew, Paterno (and his father) “could do what they wanted. And they
could do no wrong” (Bar-Lev 2014). When one considers the long list of Paterno’s
achievements, it is easy to understand why fans were upset at his removal. Paterno’s role
as hero to Penn State University conditioned the discourse of so many to the scandal that
broke first with Sandusky’s arrest and intensified with the Freeh Report.
In psychological terms, those students and fans frequently engaged in simple
denial and incorporation when responding to the Sandusky scandal in the late Fall and
Winter of 2011-2012. These defense mechanisms, while powerful, are often employed
unconsciously by individuals who experience trauma or perceive themselves to be under
attack. Phebe Cramer explains denial as “a mental operation in which attention is
withdrawn from external stimuli that, if recognized, would cause psychological pain or
upset. The focus here is on a defense mechanism that functions to ward off external
reality” (Cramer 37). In the case of Penn State students and fans, comments from within
the group exemplify this notion of denial. Most notably, the protest that erupted in the
streets of State College following the Board of Trustees’ announcement of Paterno’s
removal was full of remarks manifesting simple denial. One male student made a point to
interrupt an ESPN interview with his peer to assert that “There’s no crime. We are Penn
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State. There’s no crime here” (Farrey 2011).4 Over time, declarations such as this one
became more nuanced, as both the Grand Jury Presentment and Freeh Report showed
Paterno’s involvement in the cover-up of child abuse within football facilities. Even then,
particular Penn State fans and students clung to the idea the Paterno was either
uninvolved or minimally involved in the events of the Penn State cover-up. Cramer’s
comment implies that simple denial of JoePa’s enabling behavior was rooted in a notion
of psychological defense. Discussion of this manner of defense will be taken up in later
sections of this thesis.
Developmental psychology can also help to elucidate Penn State student and fan
implementation of incorporation: “With incorporation, the motive is to possess, to have,
to become merged with the object. There is little or no distinction between the subject
and the object; the boundaries are fluid and ambiguous” (Cramer 86). Students and fans
of Penn State football manifested in their vehement and largely combative protection of
Joe Paterno that they had incorporated the man into conceptions of their own identity.
Even at a candlelight vigil being held for the victims of Sandusky’s abuse, Leah Blasko, a
Penn State junior at the time, commented, “Having [Paterno] taken away from us made
us feel lost. Tonight really gave us a place to put ourselves back together” (CBS 2).
Blasko’s reflection was obviously shared by many of her peers on campus 5 and illustrates
this particular insider group’s incorporation of Joe Paterno as an integral component of
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their relationship and identification with Penn State University. This incorporation is
what motivated so many students to feel personally harmed by administrative action
taken against their beloved coach. The most shameful part of the above quotation is that it
took place at a vigil being held for victims. Even during an event meant to take the focus
away from Paterno, students could not help but express concern for Paterno’s well-being
prior to acknowledging the young boys who had their lives shattered not only directly by
Sandusky but also indirectly by Spanier, Curley, Schultz, and Paterno. The all-pervasive
concern for Paterno reflects his incorporation into the personal identities of so many
students and fans.
Another rhetorical pattern manifested by Penn State fans and students was a
shifting of focus away from matters pertinent to the scandal itself. Many Penn State
students and fans tried to reframe public perception of their institution to appear more
positive. This reframing of their institution’s reputation is based on “[a]n unquestioned
belief in the group’s inherent morality, inclining the members to ignore the ethical or
moral consequences of their decisions” (Janis 174). In the days and weeks following the
publication of the Freeh Report and NCAA sanction announcement, many students and
fans attending rallies and football games boasted about things like Penn State studentathlete graduation rates (Bar-Lev 2014). This tactic helped to strengthen the bond
between students, alumni, and fans of Penn State University and to further vilify
outsiders condemning the football program, as they understood the program and
university to be undeserving of punishment due to all of the good they had done. In
addition, comments such as these served the invaluable role of reframing the broader
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conversation surrounding Penn State more favorably. Brown et al describe this strategy
using Coomb’s notion of “reminding” during crisis communication: “[the reminder]
strategy is meant to refocus attention from the scandal and place it on facts that shed Penn
State in a more positive light” (Brown et al 302). In their study, which compiled and
analyzed tweets from Penn State fans in the aftermath of the scandal, Brown et al came
across examples of reminding such as “For your information, #PennState students are the
number 1 employed grads in the nation. Fight on State!’” (Brown et al 302). Others
tweeted that people should not forget about all of Penn State’s charitable work at events
such as THON. Reminder claims of this nature, while true, clearly have nothing to do
with Penn State’s culpability for Sandusky’s continued abuse, and, therefore, should be
left out of a discussion focusing on the scandal and its cover-up. These claims are nothing
more than irrelevant comments meant to distract people from the corrupt behavior of
Penn State’s principal leaders. All in all, students and fans alike chose to remind outsiders
of Penn State’s most impressive institutional qualities in an attempt to mitigate criticism
from both insiders and outsiders.
Brown et al also describe a strategy called ingratiation employed by Penn State
students and fans on Twitter that kept attention away from not only Sandusky’s victims,
but the scandal itself: “Penn state fans also used the ingratiation strategy to garner support
from the Penn State fan base. These tweets are meant to celebrate what it means to be a
true Penn State fan” (Brown et al 302). Rather than direct public attention to the more
damning components of the misconduct at their institution, students and fans using
ingratiation wanted to show appreciation for just how special it is to be a Nittany Lion. In
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their research, Brown et al came across messages such as, “‘I will NEVER be ashamed to
be a #NittanyLion. WE ARE bigger than the actions of a few. WE ARE the
#NittanyNation. WE ARE #PENNSTATE’” (Brown et al 299). The rallying cry “WE
ARE,” heard at nearly every gathering of Penn Staters (including the riots following
Paterno’s dismissal, football games following the scandal, etc.), is the perfect example of
what Brown et al and Coombs identify as ingratiation. This unconsciously-used strategy
of PSU students and fans differs very little from a notion of “reminding.” In both cases,
individuals forced into a defensive position by internal and external scrutiny employ a
variety of messages meant to distract from the shameful behavior. In the case of the
Sandusky scandal, students and fans presented a united front of reminding and
ingratiation to take some of the heat off their university.
Another popular psychological maneuver identified by Brown et al which was
certainly present amongst Penn State students and fans during the scandal was
scapegoating. In the expansive database of tweets compiled by these researchers, the four
most commonly identified parties singled out for blame were, in order, the PSU
administration (mentioned in 20.5% of tweets), sports media (mentioned in 8.2% of
tweets), Jerry Sandusky (mentioned in 7.1% of tweets), and Mike McQueary (mentioned
in 3.3% of tweets). One of the most startling implications of this is that the Penn State fan
base was more reluctant to place blame on Jerry Sandusky for the criticisms and
sanctions they encountered than their own administration or sports media. Additionally,
this data shows Penn State fans readily criticizing the whistleblower who exposed the
scandal, McQueary, exemplifying the insider-insider conflict that will be touched upon in
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the following chapter. Another example of conflict embedded in this data was a largescale attack on the outside entity of sports media. Notably, these scapegoating messages,
which make up a significant amount of student and fan response to the scandal, make no
mention of the involvement of the football program, Paterno, or even football culture.
Returning to Cramer, it can be said that these scapegoating tactics may be the
result of attempted psychological projection of anxiety or guilt by students and fans. In
her volume on defense mechanisms, while discussing symptoms of projection, she
mentions:
Another component of projection may occur in connection with this ominous
alteration of reality. As the world becomes more frightening, the individual may
attempt to develop an ‘explanation’ for the disturbing happenings. In some cases,
the explanation takes on a logically consistent form, with conclusions following
closely from premises. In this case, projection contributes to the formation of a
delusion, in which circumstantial reasoning and ideas of reference contribute to
the further alteration of reality (Cramer 64).
What students and fans were doing by utilizing a scapegoating strategy was taking all of
their responsibility or guilt by association and forcing them into their external
surroundings in the form of scapegoats. They needed to develop an explanation for the
criticism being brought upon their beloved university. While these explanations may look
like delusional and denial-ridden assessments of the situation, it is important to remember
that they made emotional sense to the students and fans themselves. As a largely
ideologically homogeneous insider faction, students and fans used scapegoating to foster
and maintain what Janis calls “[a] shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments
conforming to the majority view” (Janis 175). Therefore, this projected illusion of who
was “really” at fault in the Sandusky scandal (the media, the administration, or

28
McQueary) served to buttress social bonds within the group and to increase the
effectiveness of other tactics like ingratiation.
It is also possible to analyze Penn State students and fans being at odds with both
insiders and outsiders in the wake of Sandusky’s transgressions in conjunction with a
description of their discourse. Beginning with insiders, students and fans were not shy
about calling out dissenters amongst their peers. Although they were in the minority,
there were members of the Penn State community who went on record criticizing Paterno
and the university in general for their behavior. In an interview with ESPN during what
is referred to as the “Paterno riot,” one such student bravely spoke his mind: “The
decision tonight, honestly I think it was the right one. JoePa could’ve done more. It’s a
terrible situation, but he should’ve done more. There’s a lot more that could’ve been
done… Look at what we’re surrounded by, it’s disgusting… I’m embarrassed for the
university, for Joe Paterno, for everybody. It’s a shame” (Farrey 2011). This same
individual was interrupted and insulted by his peers in the surrounding area while on
camera, and he even mentioned later in the interview that he did not feel safe holding and
expressing such an opinion publically at the time of the riot. Another example of insiderinsider conflict, when it comes to students and fans, occurred at Coach Paterno’s nowremoved statue outside of Beaver Stadium following his death. A self-proclaimed proud
Penn State fan chose to stand by the statue for a large portion of a day holding a sign
calling Joe Paterno an enabler of child molestation. Other Penn State fans who showed up
at the statue to take pictures were caught on camera antagonizing and threatening this
man, a fellow Penn Stater, for not moving from his position beside the sign (Bar-Lev

29
2014). Janis would frame these incidents according to groupthink theory as “Direct
pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against any of the group’s
stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, making clear that this type of dissent is contrary
to what is expected of all loyal members” (Janis 175). By lashing out against and
attempting to silence group members with non-normative perspectives, Penn State
students and fans showed an unwillingness to allow for diversity of views within their
community. Whether this closed mindedness was rooted in anxiety, guilt, or outright fear,
the uniformity of discourse it generates is what permits researchers to employ
generalizations about the discourse of Penn State students and fans following the scandal
(one dominant voice presented by community due to silencing).
Not surprisingly, Penn State students and fans also readily spoke out against
outsiders criticizing an institution and athletic program with which they identified. As
was mentioned in the discussion of scapegoating, these individuals were outspoken in
their critique of the national media. Perhaps the two most illustrative examples of this
came during the “Paterno riot.” Once word of Paterno’s dismissal broke, thousands of
students took to the streets of downtown State College, causing massive destruction to
cars, light posts, and signs. Significantly, these students also took the time to tip over a
WTAJ news van parked in the streets as an act of aggression against outsiders framing
the scandal in an unacceptable way. Also, that night, students outside Joe Paterno’s
household on McKee Street threatened members of the media, uttering rhythmic chants
like “Fuck the media!” and “Break the camera!” (Bar-Lev 2014). Local cameraman Pat
Little went on record in an interview for the 2014 documentary, Happy Valley, saying
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that the night of the “Paterno riot” was the first time he had ever felt unsafe in State
College (Bar-Lev 2014). Even weeks after the events of that night, Penn State fans acted
in a hostile fashion towards outside media outlets like ESPN, mentioning that these
people “only show the bad” and that they “were not welcome” and should “take their
story elsewhere” (Bar-Lev 2014). These Penn State students and fans were trying to
discredit those they believed were looking to harm their institution and, thus, their
identity. These comments also show Penn State students and fans planting the seeds for
the unifying strategy known as siege mentality. Siege mentality will be covered at a later
point in this thesis.
In conclusion, Penn State students and fans of Penn State football, when
considered as a single subsection of the enormous PSU community, behaved like a group
under attack. Rather than express widespread concern for the victims of Sandusky’s
assaults, these individuals allowed their words and actions to be affected by their
affiliation with Penn State. Students and fans made attempts to keep the focus on Joe
Paterno as a martyr to avoid the issue of abuse and to scapegoat Jerry Sandusky, the PSU
administration or the media. These patterns of behavior are primary indicators of the
growing divide in perception of the Sandusky scandal between most Penn State students
and fans and those outside that community.
Despite this general trend, attention must also be paid to the isolated instances of
positive victim identification and empathy. The most obvious example of this was a large
gathering held the Friday after Joe Paterno’s firing by the Board of Trustees to express
sympathy for Sandusky’s victims. One of the vigil’s attendees bluntly said, "What I really
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want to focus on is the victims right now” when being interviewed by CBS (CBS 2). This
display of concern for the real victims of the scandal made by the Penn State student
body show that generalizations about a population’s speech and behavior can be
insightful at some times and harmful at others. At Penn State’s game against Nebraska
the Saturday following the Grand Jury Presentment of November 2011, some fans
followed up on the aims of the vigil by holding signs that read “For the kids” (but this
was partially tarnished by an equal number of “For Joe Pa” signs in the stands). In terms
of broader cultural symbols, the victims of Sandusky were also recognized when a lone
blue ribbon, signifying victims of child abuse, took the place of Jerry Sandusky on a
mural in downtown State College depicting major figures of Penn State University.
Unfortunately, gestures such as these were few and far between in State College. Even
mentioning concern for the victims became so normalized as to drop out of student
comments over time. In Happy Valley, a featured student, Tyler Estright (‘13) said, “I
hate how every time I have to share my opinion about Penn State football and what
happened that I have to say, ‘I feel bad for the victims.’ No shit! That should just be
common sense” (Bar-Lev 2014). Not every mention of Penn State requires recognition of
Sandusky’s victims. What is shocking and unfortunate, however, is the startling number
of individuals inside the Penn State community who failed to mention them at all. While
important, these scattered acknowledgements of Sandusky’s victims will not be
addressed here, as this thesis aims to analyze the dominant responses of members of the
Penn State community. The resoundingly dominant response coming out of Happy

32
Valley at this time was the defensive backlash against criticism of JoePa and the
program.

Local Retail Business Owners:

Yet another collection of insiders to the Nittany Lion community choosing to
enter into the conversation surrounding Penn State University and its football program
consisted of local shop owners, especially business owners responsible for selling
merchandise with targeted messages regarding PSU and its enemies printed on it. While
the act of selling t-shirts, car magnets, and other memorabilia is much different from the
presentation of ideology through overt speech or performance, there can be no doubt that
particular products were designed with specific rhetorical goals in mind. On one hand,
these merchants were certainly taking advantage of a tumultuous situation and
subsequent wave of sentiment regarding the university to increase profits. On the other,
sale of products depicting messages like those shown in Appendix B represent a group of
PSU insiders looking to take control of local discourse through the circulation of
rhetorical iconography. In selling merchandise with such a clear ideological message,
local retailers took stances regarding events of the scandal nearly identical to the students
and fans they call customers.
Beginning again with Joe Paterno, shelves at stores in State College and
surrounding municipalities soon became flooded with items depicting the number 409
(representing Paterno’s 409 victories as a head coach). Establishments like the frequently
visited Student Book Store in downtown State College made a strong push to sell a host
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of other products making reference to the legendary coach. In doing so, retailers within
the Penn State community positioned themselves as unwavering supporters of the popular
student movements to pay homage to their mistreated coach. One of the most vital
functions of merchandise like this was its ability to buttress local ideology and further
reify already rigid local perspectives on the scandal. While it had already become not
only commonplace but easy for Penn State supporters to express their perspectives on the
scandal, these shirts, magnets, and other items now made it so that they could do so
without words. For example, 409 shirts could now be worn like a badge of honor
amongst Penn Staters or a uniform for those not gifted enough athletically to actually suit
up for the Nittany Lions each and every Saturday. Furthermore, by keeping the spotlight
on Paterno, retailers effectively cemented his role as a martyr and the scandal’s most
commonly-cited victim.
Yet another fascinating merchandise campaign came into play once the university
announced the hiring of Bill O’Brien to take over as head coach of the Nittany Lion
football team in 2012. The hiring of O’Brien, a graduate of Brown University (like
Paterno), who had most recently been the offensive coordinator for the New England
Patriots (the team Paterno rejected so many years earlier) made a splash in Happy Valley,
as few Penn State fans believed any high-profile coaches would be willing to take on the
role of Paterno’s successor. However, O’Brien handled the opportunity with poise for a
pair of seasons before leaving to become the head coach of the NFL’s Houston Texans.
The excitement in Happy Valley over O’Brien’s arrival generated a growing interest in
clothing displaying the messages “O’Brien’s Lions” and “Billieve.” Public interest in
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apparel of this nature demonstrated O’Brien becoming a magnet for the love Penn State
fans once felt for Paterno as well as loyalty to whoever coaches PSU. Perhaps O’Brien’s
success leading a Patriots offense that perennially dominated the NFL led many to view
him as a savior, capable of ushering in a new era of success for the Blue and White. Thus,
“O’Brien’s Lions” and “Billieve” merchandise served the ultimate purpose of
reestablishing a wounded community’s faith in something (and in particular, football).
After so much turmoil, Penn Staters had the opportunity to revel in some good news
coming out of their beloved football team. Simply put, the Penn State community became
desperate looking for a symbol to attach their energy to, and the sale of items referencing
the new head coach simplified this process.
Finally, local retailers were also involved in attacks on entities and institutions
deemed threatening to the Penn State community. Most notably, following the
announcement of the NCAA sanctions levied on the Penn State football program, many
fans and students could be seen walking around campus wearing apparel likening the
NCAA to Soviet Russia. Gear like this, which replaced the “C” in NCAA with a hammer
and sickle, expressed fan and student criticism of outsiders they perceived to be “out to
get them.” These shirts, which could be seen on many Penn State fans attending football
games following the announcement of the sanctions, helped to bring these criticisms into
the dominant ideological superstructure of Happy Valley. Interestingly, the message of
this shirt positions the NCAA as an “evil” institution that is the natural enemy of
American ideals (capitalism, freedom, etc.) that are often not far from the surface of a
football context. Thus, to be a supporter of Penn State became, in Happy Valley,
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implicitly an act of patriotism. They also expressed the retailers’ sense of personal
victimization by the NCAA sanctions, as they had the potential to reduce interest in Penn
State University and its football program, therefore diminishing their success in the
marketplace.
Although looking at retailers in the way outlined above may seem unorthodox,
when their products are understood as cultural symbols, they can begin to be analyzed as
part of the insider PSU community. Aside from making a profit by selling these products,
shop owners in the State College area left their mark on the culture and rhetoric of an
entire community. Their products ultimately served the purpose of further strengthening
bonds between Penn State supporters through simplified and unspoken messages of
solidarity. They also represent yet another group of individuals who, albeit indirectly,
aided in hiding Sandusky’s true victims from view by intensifying public interest in
Paterno, O’Brien, and the NCAA.

The Paterno Family:
A third subsection of Penn State’s insider population that grew to become
especially vocal following the publication of the Freeh Report was the Paterno family. In
particular, JoePa’s wife, Sue, and two of his sons, Scott and Jay, spoke to protect Joe’s
legacy and prevent anyone from besmirching the Paterno name. In a series of public
statements 6 and interviews over the course of several years, the Paterno family made it
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clear that this was their highest priority. The Paterno family attempted to do this in three
primary ways: a) attacking outside entities like Sandusky, PSU’s Board of Trustees, the
NCAA, and Freeh’s investigation, b) attempting to justify Joe’s lack of extensive action
or follow-up when notified about Sandusky’s assault, and c) rallying support for Paterno
by positioning him as a morally upstanding victim.
The first of these scapegoats for the Paterno family was Jerry Sandusky. As Joe’s
son, Jay, mentioned in Happy Valley, “The truth is there was no enabling of Jerry
Sandusky. The truth is this is not a Penn State issue, this is not a Joe Paterno issue, this is
a Jerry Sandusky issue” (Bar-Lev 2014). This comment serves the dual function of first
liberating coach Paterno (and Penn State writ large) from all suspected “enabling” of
Sandusky and then positioning Sandusky as the scandal’s truest monster. Other
statements from the Paterno camp, which soon expanded to include a legal counsel led by
Wick Sollers, continued to emphasize Sandusky’s role as criminal, demonstrated in his
careful grooming of victims and acquaintances before and after his assaults. This
carefully-constructed, albeit truthful, vilification of Jerry Sandusky on the part of the
Paternos was a strategy to sway the public into maximizing Sandusky’s role as enemy to
a point where there would be no more interest in investigating other potential offenders.
Simply put, the family’s amplification of Sandusky can be viewed as nothing more than a
redistribution of blame away from Paterno, as an indirect actor, to the main culprit.
Beyond Sandusky, the Paterno family also criticized Louis Freeh, the Penn State
Board of Trustees, and the NCAA in public statements. Following the publication of the
Freeh report, the family famously launched their own investigation, led by Wick Sollers,
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into problems with the Freeh report and the NCAA’s treatment of Joe Paterno. The main
conclusion of the subsequent report from Sollers and his team went far beyond a simple
questioning of Freeh: “the observations as to Joe Paterno in the Freeh report are
unfounded, and have done a disservice not only to Joe Paterno and to the Penn State
University community, but also to the victims of Jerry Sandusky and the critical mission
of educating the public on the dangers of child sexual victimization” (Sollers et al 1). The
Paterno family, while being indirectly spoken for by Sollers here, clearly wanted to clear
Joe Paterno’s name by discrediting his main critic. Sollers spent a great deal of his report
questioning not only the findings of Freeh’s report, but also the manner in which it was
conducted. Sollers and the Paterno’s were so adamant about their critiques of the Freeh
report because it was the most widely known and officially-licensed account of Paterno’s
culpability. If they were successful in popularizing a conception of Louis Freeh as
unprofessional by unraveling his investigation, all voices criticizing Paterno would have
to be silenced. In doing so, the Paterno family attempted to transfer understanding of
Coach Paterno’s role in the Sandusky scandal from the realm of morality and ethics and
into the realm of legality (where Paterno had done everything he was obligated to do).
The second portion of Sollers’ work against the Freeh report involved moving
beyond a simple discrediting of Louis Freeh. In Sollers’ report, the author also attempted
to shift the label of immoral from JoePa to Freeh himself: “The Freeh report missed a
critical opportunity to educate the public on the identification of child sexual
victimization, and instead used the platform created by this scandal to sensationalize the
blaming of Joe Paterno” (Sollers et al 3). By describing Freeh as a sensationalist, Sollers
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not only reiterates his depiction of Freeh as a disreputable investigator, but also implies
that he was not acting ethically in his publication of his report. Here, Sollers looked to
promote a claim about Freeh that many had been making about Paterno in the months
following the scandal: that he was actually hurting Sandusky’s victims through his
investigation. In this way, Sollers and the Paternos effectively transplanted Freeh into a
preexisting conversation regarding indirect harming of the boys involved in the scandal.
This was nothing more than another scapegoating tactic employed in order to defend
Paterno from scrutiny.
Following from this, the Paterno family also repeatedly mentioned their
disappointment in the NCAA for relying on the Freeh report while generating their
sanctions to hand down to Penn State. In one such instance, the family issued a statement
saying,
The release of the Freeh report has triggered an avalanche of
vitriol, condemnation and posthumous punishment on Joe Paterno.
The NCAA has now become the latest party to accept the report as
the final word on the Sandusky scandal. The sanctions announced
by the NCAA today defame the legacy and contributions of a great
coach and educator without any input from our family or those
who knew him best (Paterno Family 1).
While the family made similar comments pertaining to several decisions made on the part
of the Penn State Board of Trustees (including the decision to remove Joe’s statue outside
Beaver Stadium), this written attack on the NCAA is the most telling. Like many others
made by the Paterno family and their legal counsel, this statement positions Joe Paterno
as the victim while adding the NCAA to the ever-lengthening list of Sandusky scandal
scapegoats. Much like they did with Freeh, the Paternos used comments like this to
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discredit Joe’s critics. The Paternos also claim that acceptance of the Freeh report as the
standard assessment of the events of the scandal by the NCAA, the media, and Penn State
University actually harmed the victims by burying the truth about what actually happened
to them. In this way, the Paternos justified their investigation as being in the service of
the victims themselves: “We believe the only way to help the victims is to uncover the
full truth. The Freeh report, though it has been accepted by the media as the definitive
conclusion on the Sandusky scandal, is the equivalent of an indictment - a charging
document written by a prosecutor - and an incomplete and unofficial one at that” (Paterno
Family 1). Again, criticism of Freeh is present, but, in this case, it does not take center
stage. This statement rallies support for the family’s actions as a service to the victims.
Invoking the victims in such a way, rather than expressing actual sympathy, exemplifies
the Paterno family looking to reverse polarized perception of the scandal by labelling
themselves, the insiders, as the heroes, and institutions like the NCAA as evil.
Aside from scapegoating, the Paterno family also sought to justify Joe’s lack of
follow-up with Sandusky in the wake of allegations that were brought to his attention. In
conjunction with Sollers’ investigation, the family also promoted testimony and analysis
from a former FBI investigator and profiler, Jim Clemente:
Paterno, like everyone else who knew Sandusky, simply fell victim
to effective ‘grooming.’ [Grooming is a dynamic process of
seemingly innocent, positive public behaviors by the offender,
aimed at gaining the trust of the targeted child, parents and the
community.] As an expert behavioral analyst and based on my
review of the evidence, Paterno did not believe that the information
he received from McQueary amounted to Sandusky being a
predatory child sex offender (Sollers et al 4).
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Here, Sollers and his team appeal to their own FBI source to absolve Joe entirely of all
blame. They essentially reported that Paterno did as anyone else would have in the same
position. In this way, Sollers and the Paternos defended the coach’s morality by moving
beyond a discussion of legal obligation. Sue Paterno also corroborated this perspective in
a 2013 interview with Katie Couric. In answering Couric’s question regarding why her
husband did not follow up more aggressively on McQueary’s statements or confront
Sandusky directly, she mentioned, “To us, that was Jerry being Jerry. Being with young
children. We didn’t have that mindset that he was doing anything more than teaching
them, working out with them, and getting a shower… The people who saw Jerry every
day had no clue. But Joe wouldn’t confront him, he didn’t work for Joe anymore” (Couric
2013). Again, a member of the Paterno family here promotes the idea that Joe could not
have had any idea how serious Sandusky’s behavior actually was. The Paterno family
may have hoped that by framing Sandusky as masterfully manipulative they could impact
outsider perception of JoePa for their benefit. Stances like these, backed by sources like
Clemente, were rooted in the desire to give the legendary coach the “benefit of the doubt”
by rationalizing his behavior.
A final pattern found in the rhetoric of the Paterno family appeals to his “strong
character.” In a message to all PSU Lettermen written in 2015, Sue Paterno did exactly
this:
His legacy is his family and you his players. How you live your life
speaks louder than any report. The great fathers, husbands and
citizens you have become fulfill the dreams Joe had. All that we
want - and what I believe we owe the victims, Joe Paterno and
everyone who cares about Penn State - is the full record of what
happened. On this point, I know the advice Joe would give. Don't

41
give up. Don't be afraid. Do the right thing. And make sure your
actions serve the greater good (Paterno 1).
This statement of Sue’s, which covertly takes a shot at Freeh’s account of the scandal,
makes JoePa sound nothing if not deserving of his distinction as “Saint Joe.” It can be
seen here that the Paterno family’s stated goal to help the victims gets overshadowed by
praise of JoePa’s unmatched sense of ethics and leadership (in addition to scapegoating
and justifying PSU’s inaction).
The discourse of the Paterno family, much like all other groups dissected in this
chapter, was obviously more complicated than these three tactics. Justice would not be
done to the Paterno family if no mention was made about their statements which showed
sincere sympathy for the victims. Sadly, statements like this were frequently dwarfed by
comments and actions demonstrative of the aforementioned three tactics being employed
in the same breath. One of the few examples of the Paterno family expressing sympathy
for Sandusky’s victims independent of other rhetoric came when Scott Paterno addressed
the media outside his parents’ home following Joe’s dismissal. Scott mentioned, before
making any other comments, that, as a father, he was devastated for the victims and their
families. He went on to mention that primary focus and concern should be granted to
them (Bar-Lev 2014). Apart from this, the Paterno family also issued a statement
following the Board of Trustees’ decision to fire Joe that assured everyone they had no
intention of “condoning” or “minimizing” the plight of Sandusky’s victims. Much like
the fans and students of Penn State University, gestures such as these only existed as
isolated incidents for the Paterno family. Their lack of frequency does nothing if not
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identify the rhetorical priorities of the family. It is hard not to define the main goal of the
Paternos as clearing the name of the former Nittany Lion head coach.

Select Outsider Perspectives

Outside Media:

The most prominent group of individuals not affiliated with Penn State University
who choose to speak out regarding the Sandusky scandal, its cover-up, and reactions to
both of these events has been the media. For the most part, media outlets independent
from Penn State University were highly critical of Sandusky, the Penn State
administration, Joe Paterno, and PSU fans/students in their presentation of new
developments. However, just as it was key to acknowledge ideological dissonance within
sub-groups connected to the university, it should be noted that external journalistic voices
could be just as discordant. A dominant perspective on the events of the scandal and its
motivating factors did eventually emerge from the broader media cohort and the minority
voices were forced to occupy a liminal discursive space; in some cases, they were
eliminated altogether in the outside media’s process of presenting sobering and critical
accounts of the scandal.
The most frequently employed rhetorical strategy of outside media sources in
covering the happenings of the scandal was to be highly critical of seemingly all actors
connected to the university. This was done in a number of ways from a number of
different outlets, as individuals used social media posts, visuals (comics), and pointed
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opinion pieces to achieve this goal. 7 These three avenues likely became so heavily
utilized because they involve more relaxed standards in terms of professional objectivity.
Each of these rhetorical modes is highly subjective and therefore allows journalists and
artists the opportunity to be more expressive of their opinion on a given event. In the case
of the Sandusky scandal, these opinions were largely negative. Thus, national
publications (social media posts, cartoons, and opinion pieces) frequently served as direct
counters to Penn State insider sentiment.
Sanderson and Hambrick compiled a corpus constructed of Twitter posts from
sports journalists related to the scandal at Penn State. One major conclusion of the textual
analysis that they conducted was that sports journalists presented information in a much
different way than they otherwise would when composing a more traditional journalistic
piece: “Twitter also seems to elevate sports journalists’ willingness to step outside
professional spheres. Many of the journalists uttered commentary that would be unlikely
to appear in more traditional platforms…” (Sanderson & Hambrick 397). For example,
sports journalists took advantage of the immediacy and informality of Twitter to offer
candid critiques of some of the scandal’s actors like, “‘Gee, poor Joe all upset he was red
via a phone call. Had he made a phone call to police to prevent rapes he wouldn’t be in
this spot’ (Jay Glazer- 730)” (Sanderson & Hambrick 391). Comments of this nature,
which would be out of place in a more “traditional” method of publication for someone
like Jay Glazer, were matched in the realm of cartoons surrounding the scandal. In

7

While select social media posts and opinion pieces will be highlighted in this chapter, sample editorial
cartoons can be found in Appendix C.
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Appendix C, sample cartoons demonstrate a general trend amongst graphic artists
covering the scandal to visually represent some of the most scathing criticisms of those
not affiliated with Penn State. Just as social media posts took advantage of conventions
which permit presentation of discourse that is far from neutral, so too did cartoons
representing particular facets of the saga.
Aside from these non-traditional forms of publication, many journalists from a
variety of outlets (sports, national news, etc.) chose to write searing critiques of Penn
State and its football culture in the form of sports commentary and opinion articles
following news breaking of Sandusky’s transgressions. 8 In works such as these, reporters
did not pull any punches, and almost universally condemned essentially all Penn Staters
for their shameful behavior. Unlike insider populations, writers of these opinion pieces
were also upfront about the emotion and personal conviction that they would allow to
govern their ultimate message.
In Sanderson and Hambrick’s terms, social media posts, cartoons, and opinion
pieces relied on a “framing” strategy. The authors define framing as, “...a) strategically
emphasizing certain aspects of a story to promote particular definitions, interpretations,
evaluations, or recommendations; and b) invoking socially shared meanings that are
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Mike Wise, "Penn State doesn’t get to decide JoePa’s legacy: I know.”

Skip Bayless and Rob Parker, ESPN First Take. YouTube, uploaded by ESPN Player, 10 Nov. 2011
Bill Plaschke, "This should be the end of Paterno State.”
Steve Rosenbloom, "Pedophilia State University idiots just don’t get it."
Jennifer Rubin, "Joe Paterno doesn’t get it, is fired."
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consistent over time that symbolically structure and organize the social world”
(Sanderson & Hambrick 387). If we accept that critiques of Penn State administration,
coaches, fans, and students often relied on this strategy of framing, then it is clear that
these journalists and artists presented just as slanted a perspective as insider populations.
For this reason, observers of the scandal and its consequences wishing to remain as
objective as possible should not solely gravitate towards this impassioned rhetoric (just as
they would not think to only listen to Penn State fans and students). However, simply by
being classified as independent social media posts or editorial in nature, these
publications were more upfront about their inherent biases than the conversation coming
out of Happy Valley.
Aside from these passionate, albeit biased, social media posts, cartoons, and
opinion pieces, news outlets also printed more outwardly objective presentations of
events as the Penn State saga unfolded. However, these sobering retellings of events
transpiring in Happy Valley diverged from insider discourse as much as the
aforementioned opinionated publications did, just in a different way. Many of these
articles and interviews, in either title or in content (or both), served a function that was
,
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largely absent in the discourse of insider populations.9 10 These articles and their titles,
unlike the dialogue of Penn State insider populations, showed a willingness to present
actual facts (rather than deny them), acknowledge the true victims of the scandal (rather
than hide them from view), and interrogate the institutional mechanisms that not only
enabled Sandusky’s crimes but also kept them hidden for so long (rather than focus on
redeeming institutional qualities). 11 In these more journalistic articles and interviews, Bob
Costas, Katie Couric, and others were willing to factually dissect the scandal and
reactions to it while avoiding the pitfalls of insider populations (for example, Bob Costas
using careful and direct language in his interview with Jerry Sandusky). Therefore, just as
social media posts, editorial cartoons, and opinion pieces prioritized different information
and presented divergent messages from those provided by insider populations, so too did
traditional journalistic pieces expose the duplicity of the insider discourse. Before any
theoretical analysis of the scandal and the reactions to it, this divide in and of itself serves

Jerry Sandusky and Bob Costas, “Sandusky Speaks” Rock Center with Brian Williams November 14
2011
9

Sue Paterno and Katie Couric, "Exclusive: Was Joe Paterno Involved in a Cover-Up at Penn State?"
Mark Viera, "Former Coach at Penn State Is Charged With Abuse."
Associated Press and CBS, "Paterno fired over Penn St. child abuse scandal."
Even BBC News ran a short story regarding student response to Paterno’s firing. The article was simply
titled “Penn State students riot after coach Joe Paterno is sacked.” Interestingly, this news outlet, which was
clearly far removed from the situation in State College, found the word “riot” suitable in their title (as
opposed to “gathering” or “protest”).
10

One interesting example of this came in 2011 when ESPN’s David Lloyd shared his opinion on one Penn
State student interviewed following Paterno’s firing: “He was smart enough to allude to the victims first,
because they do come first.”
11
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as proof of the pervasiveness of institutional allegiance and defense mechanisms that
members of any community use when they feel their group is under attack.

The NCAA and Louis Freeh
The two other major outside parties involved in the “Sandusky conversation”
were Louis Freeh and NCAA President, Mark Emmert. Both of these men were involved
in some way with punitive measures being handed down to Penn State. Freeh’s
investigation served as the basis for the NCAA’s decision to punish Penn State and its
football program and, in the wake of the sanctions being decided upon, Emmert
announced and defended the decision of the Executive Committee of the NCAA (Emmert
was careful to mention that he did not have the authority to punish Penn State himself).
The public involvement of Freeh and Emmert led to them being made into scapegoats by
the Penn State community. Even years after the Freeh report was published and NCAA
sanctions were announced, these two were almost universally vilified in the State College
community for their involvement in supposedly tarnishing the once pristine reputation of
Penn State football. Thus, following their initial condemnations of Penn State’s football
culture, Freeh and Emmert spent most of their time reiterating their positions and
defending themselves when confronted with criticism. They were unwavering in their
opposition to the narratives coming out of the Penn State community.
The first category of comments made by Freeh and Emmert that differs from
those of Penn State community members concerns the initial acknowledgement of the
crimes that took place. These two, as outside observers of the scandal and its aftermath,
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did not engage in any sort of denial or minimization of what happened at PSU and
condemned not only those directly involved in the scandal, but also the indirect influence
of State College’s football culture in their comments. Freeh spelled out exactly what had
happened within the Penn State administration: “I stand by our conclusion that four of the
most powerful people at Penn State failed to protect against a child sexual predator
harming children for over a decade. These men exhibited a striking lack of empathy for
Sandusky's victims by failing to inquire as to their safety and well-being” (Freeh 1).
Unlike virtually all Penn Staters, Freeh was never reluctant to implicate Joe Paterno for
his involvement in the cover-up of Sandusky’s assaults. Additionally, no amount of
outside criticism could shake Freeh from his belief that these administrators had engaged
in criminal behavior for which they deserved to be punished. When excerpts from
Emmert’s announcements of NCAA sanctions against Penn State are added to Freeh’s
statements, a broader picture of the problem in State College comes into focus: “Our goal
is not to be just punitive but to make sure the university establishes an athletic culture and
daily mindset in which football will never again be placed ahead of educating, nurturing,
and protecting young people” (Emmert 2012). When the judgements of these two men
are put into conversation with one another, it becomes obvious that not only the four men
mentioned by Freeh, but also hundreds of thousands of fans, students, and alumni helped
to make such a scandal possible. Together, their criticisms serve the important role of not
only placing blame on the criminals involved, but also fans who helped to reinforce their
prioritization of football.
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Freeh and Emmert both frequently found themselves being discredited and
criticized in statements made by Penn State insiders. Louis Freeh even faced a counter
investigation launched by the Paterno family in an attempt to invalidate his initial report
(which was both commissioned and agreed upon by Penn State University). Although
Freeh’s official response will be looked at in the second chapter of this thesis, the former
FBI Director participated in several interviews where he mentioned that he and his team
had done all they needed to, “Could we have done another six months of work? Yes. But
we felt we had all the necessary facts that the board needed to make their decision”
(Thompson 1). This particular comment of Freeh’s not only shows confidence in his
investigation, but also a certain humility that was largely absent in the discourse
emanating from Happy Valley at the time. This humility and calm discourse so often
manifested by Freeh is even more impressive when it is understood that he, just like Penn
Staters, had a reputation at stake. However, Freeh’s comments exemplify a level of
professionalism and willingness to participate in two-sided conversations regarding the
Penn State scandal that was generally absent in the discourse of Penn State insiders.
Emmert was also outspoken in his defense of the decision agreed upon by the
NCAA Executive Committee. In a 2014 interview for The Seth Davis Show, Emmert
commented: “What the executive committee was worried about was that the behavior
around all of this as outlined in that report, and agreed to by the university, was clearly so
orthogonal to, antagonistic to all of the values of intercollegiate athletics and the values
that are codified in the NCAA’s Constitution that they couldn’t stand back and not act”
(Emmert 2014). In the same interview, he continues, “Ask yourself, what would have
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been the outcome if the NCAA would have said ‘Well we don’t care about this. This is
irrelevant to us’? What would that have done to people’s faith in intercollegiate athletics?
What would that have done to people’s belief that the NCAA has high values that they
expect people to live by?” (Emmert 2014). Much like Freeh, Emmert was also able to
embrace criticism regarding the decision of his organization and accept the fact that the
somewhat unprecedented sanctions would undoubtedly shock many people. Rather than
become frustrated or act outwardly defensive (as the NCAA also had a reputation at
stake), Emmert consistently pointed to the potential results of inaction on the part of the
NCAA as solid justification for the sanctions.
There are two general themes in Louis Freeh and Mark Emmert’s discourse. First
of all, the two men, like other outsider subgroups, were outspoken in their critiques of
Penn State’s administration, Joe Paterno, and the university’s football culture. In
addition, Freeh and Emmert were also steadfast in their defenses of their comments,
actions, and reputations. What separated their defenses from those affiliated with Penn
State was an unmistakable amount of maturity and professionalism. While Penn State
fans and students often had their responses to the scandal, Freeh report, and NCAA
sanctions governed by anger and a feeling of being personally victimized, Freeh and
Emmert remained calm and objective. This may initially be seen as obvious, as Freeh and
Emmert have no direct ties to PSU, but it is impressive when one equates the feelings of
the students to the scapegoating of Freeh and Emmert (as well as the whole NCAA).
Internalizing critiques of an institution led many students to feel they were being
personally and wrongfully attacked by outside factions (as their identity was wrapped up
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in Penn State). However, this “normal” feeling (from a psychological standpoint) is no
different from the personal attacks endured by Freeh and Emmert. The only difference
was in the response to it.
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Fig. 3. Shop Window in Downtown State College (Image Courtesy of CNN)

CHAPTER TWO

WE ARE!
We are Penn State! We’re always gonna be Penn State, regardless of what happens to
certain people.
Former Penn State Head Football Coach Joe Paterno addressing students outside McKee
St. home
Penn State Forever

We can now interrogate exactly why this reactionary divide emerged between the
Penn State community and those outside it. Of course, not all members of the State
College community reacted in a way that could be deemed “immoral” or “wrong” from
an outsider’s perspective. It is worth remembering that particular PSU students were
responsible for sparking more widespread support for the victims of Sandusky’s abuse,
while others spoke out against legendary figures like Joe Paterno who were implicated in
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the cover-up. Even at riots and rallies following the announcement of Joe Paterno’s
firing, students willing to buck the ideological status quo could be found. Sadly, instances
such as this were few and far between in Penn State circles, as a significant majority of
Penn State supporters followed the trends discussed in the first chapter. This behavior
showed numerous members of the PSU community falling in line with the normative
discourse surrounding the Sandusky scandal. Penn State fans and students promoting and
buying into such a narrative was due in large part to the significant portion of their
identity defined by the institution itself. The psychological splitting required to separate
oneself from the components of their identity rooted in Penn State culture (and not
associate external condemnations of the university with personal attacks) is a technique
that can only rarely be put into practice. Thus, large swaths of individuals affiliated with
Penn State in various ways, regardless of race, gender identification, social class,
education level, and sexual orientation, did the psychologically “natural” thing, and
began to employ defense mechanisms.
The goal of this thesis is to interrogate the community level forces that condition
such behavior in all group settings. The unconscious forces at work in Happy Valley
would have been almost the same in many other contexts.12 In fact, further explanation of
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While the two tragedies are in no way similar in magnitude or nature of crimes committed, the Holocaust
and Penn State scandal converge at this notion of objectively immoral behavior and sentiment of insiders
not seeming that way to them. Scholars like Dominick LaCapra have worked to understand the role of Nazi
culture in developing contextual morality during the Holocaust (for example, how good German husbands
and fathers could be the same people slaughtering countless innocent human beings). While doing just that,
LaCapra praises the work of Daniel Goldhagen because it “provides documentation for an involvement in
outlandish transgression...that doesn’t seem to be intelligible from any ‘rational’ point of view. One has to
try to approximate an understanding of why this was happening, because I don’t think this was unique to
the Germans but was something that had happened elsewhere” (LaCapra 168).
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why Penn State members should not be criticized on the grounds of “ethics” will be
fleshed out in the third chapter of this thesis, when the Roman Catholic Church’s child
abuse scandal and the University of North Carolina’s history of academic fraud take
center stage. Denial and other defense mechanisms to be analyzed later in the chapter are
accepted by professional psychologists to be unconscious and therefore uncontrollable
ones. For this reason, Penn State fans who associated themselves with the dominant
discourse coming out of Happy Valley at the time should not be perceived as monsters
seeking only to protect themselves by intentionally shifting public attention.
This introductory section will consider how the breaking of such news was a
highly traumatic experience for this entire community. By classifying the scandal in such
a way, one can begin to understand why so many Penn State supporters acted so
inappropriately. Individuals who identified with Penn State felt that they were betrayed
by their football program (Sandusky) and outside media/relationships (for example, the
media blamed Paterno for enabling child abuse). There is an extensive body of research
on responses to trauma and betrayal at both the individual and community levels,
especially about the concept of “betrayal blindness”:
Although the betrayal blindness of bystanders is terrible in its way,
it is also understandable. Just as victims may have a need not to see
the betrayal they experience, so, too, may bystanders have such a
need...Both fairness and caring can be violated by others, and when
that happens, it can create a sense of betrayal not only in the victim
but also in the minds of bystanders, who experience a betrayal of
justice, of what is right. Yet we may remain blind to this betrayal
for all of the reasons we have already discussed -- to see the
betrayal might risk too much (Freyd & Birrell 46).
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In the case of the Penn State community, what Freyd and Birrell call betrayal blindness,
or “the unawareness of information that is present but is somehow ‘whooshed’ away”
(Freyd & Birrell 9), was necessary for the preservation of the sanctity of an institution
they held dear. In addition, the betrayal blindness exhibited by “bystanders” to the
Sandusky scandal was maintained both unconsciously on an individual level, and socially
by the existence of a largely ideologically homogeneous community (individuals were
unlikely to encounter people taking opposing stances). The latter of these forces has been
discussed in myriad contexts following the exposure of immoral acts.13
In Freyd and Birrell’s volume on betrayal blindness, they even go into specific
detail regarding the Penn State scandal,
Even after Paterno’s death and the conviction of Sandusky, there
are those who support Paterno… Paterno, by his blind eye, had
created the context for Sandusky to repeat his acts of abuse on
child after child. The initial cover-up of the abuse and the later
protests from some people are examples of institutional and
societal betrayal blindness (Freyd & Birrell 39).
According to comments such as this, betrayal blindness exhibited by the Nittany
Lion supporters was used as a defense mechanism (unconscious denial) for
trauma they felt. Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery corroborates this
assessment in its discussion of collective trauma. Initially, Herman lines her
theory up with Freyd and Birrell when discussing defense mechanisms that seem
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Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison and Frances J. Milliken, "Speaking Up, Remaining
Silent: The Dynamics of Voice and Silence in Organizations.”
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to differ from betrayal blindness only in name: “The knowledge of horrible events
periodically intrudes into public awareness but is rarely retained for long. Denial,
repression, and dissociation operate on a social as well as an individual level”
(Herman 2). Long before Freyd, Birrell, and Herman, Anna Freud’s The Ego and
the Mechanisms of Defence asserted that: “...the ego is victorious when its
defensive measures effect their purpose, i.e., when they enable it to restrict the
development of anxiety and unpleasure…” (Freud 176). The assertions of Freyd,
Birrell, Herman, and Freud all fit the responses of the Penn State community,
which led to the perfectly “natural” reactions generalized in the preceding chapter.
Herman’s work goes on to identify particular remedies to feelings of
trauma sought by those exposed to distressing realizations like the ones in Happy
Valley in 2011: “The emotional support that traumatized people seek from family,
lovers, and close friends takes many forms, and it changes during the course of
resolution of the trauma… The survivor who is often in terror of being left alone
craves the simple presence of a sympathetic person” (Herman 61). Along with a
sense of community, Herman also cites a desire for control as a symptom of
psychological stress. Each of these solutions has a role in shaping the response of
the Penn State community. The reliance upon these two widespread desires in
Happy Valley was a primary cause for the discursive dissonance between the
rhetoric and responses within and outside State College.
Beginning with a sense of community, Penn State supporters involved
themselves in many acts of social unification. A network recognized for the
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rallying cry “WE ARE!” reacted to psychological dissonance by coming together
both literally (for example, riots) and in terms of discourse. However, this
reification of community is something that can become problematic, and has been
considered in the realm of groupthink. Irving Janis, a pioneer in the world of
group psychology, defines it in the following way: “Groupthink refers to a
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results
from in-group pressures” (Janis 9). For Janis, such behavior is negative, as it has
the potential to cripple individual judgement in contexts similar to the Sandusky
scandal. He goes on to claim, “Over and beyond all the familiar sources of human
error is a powerful source of defective judgment that arises in cohesive groups -the concurrence-seeking tendency, which fosters overoptimism, lack of vigilance,
and sloganistic thinking about the weakness and immorality of out-groups” (Janis
12). This implies that traumatized individuals receding into shared components of
their identity may be comforting, but is also rather dangerous. In State College,
distressed witnesses to the moral ineptitude of their cultural leaders in need of the
comfort of solidarity never thought to speak out against the frequent disregard of
Sandusky’s victims among other things.
Once this joining together became commonplace amongst Happy Valley
residents and members of the Penn State network, many may have felt trapped by
the need to remain perfectly cohesive in a time of collective trauma. This
phenomenon is far from uncommon: “Members of a group may choose to not
express dissenting opinions in the interest of maintaining consensus and
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cohesiveness in the group. Thus, silence can be caused by fear, by the desire to
avoid conveying bad news or unwelcome ideas, and also by normative and social
pressures that exist in groups” (Morrison and Milliken 1). Once it is accepted that,
on some level, the Penn State community was exposed to a great deal of
psychological distress as one of their beloved institutions fell under scrutiny, this
need to rally together makes perfect sense. As can be seen in the previous chapter,
rallying together resulted in the promotion of a communal message far removed
from that of outsider groups.
The need for reasserting control by the threatened community can also be
understood from a theoretical standpoint. By situating the insider community’s
response in the context of oral history, more light can be shed on the group’s need
for narrative and recollective control. Oral history’s work with memory, in
particular, is exceedingly helpful in the Penn State setting. In her volume of oral
history theory, Lynn Abrams writes:
...an individual’s memory is always situated within a collective or group
consciousness of an event or experience. Memory might feel personal to
us, but it is always influenced by shared memories, whether at a family,
community or even national level … the function of memory is to unite us
socially, which means that commonly agreed upon memories will tend to
predominate and alternative ones will receive little recognition and
therefore fade (Abrams 96).
By defining communal memory as an entity shaped by social networks, we can
begin to understand the Penn State community’s desire to stay unified and to
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reassert control over the narrative about the scandal. 14 In order to analyze the Penn
State scandal, memory should be understood as something that effectively
governs perspective on and coverage of an event. In scenarios where group
dynamics are idealized due to constituent members (especially traumatized ones)
needing to fall back on a strong sense of shared identity, discursive control slides
further away from individuals whose beliefs may not align exactly with the
majority (for example, Morrison and Milliken’s work with silencing). Abrams
extends this, noting that individual memorialization or opinion of events is
frequently trumped in group settings (Abrams 96). Thus, the subconscious need
for control over the presentation of traumatic events is both buttressed and limited
by a need for the comfort of community. In Happy Valley, such homogeneous
ideology surrounding the public presentation or memorialization of the Sandusky
scandal, along with its actors, could have been due in large part to initial trauma
(of betrayal and outsider attacks on identity) necessitating a joining together of
those positively affiliated with the university and a tightening of the ideological
ranks.
Following from this foundational analysis of particular theoretical and
psychological forces at play in local circles in the aftermath of the 2011 Penn
State scandal, more specific influences can be put under the microscope. In
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Abrams is not alone in this conceptualization of communal memory, as Ignacio Brescó and Brady
Wagoner discuss the phenomenon in a similar way, “Moreover, remembering always takes place within a
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perspective there is no such thing as a purely individual activity; we are always dealing with the individual
within a certain set of contextual conditions…” (Brescó & Wagoner 69).
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particular, examination of the siege mentality, gender, masculinity, sexuality, and
economics can further explain the ideological split between Penn State supporters
and outsiders. In the following sections, it will be assumed that, while the Penn
State community did experience trauma in the form of betrayal, the true victims of
the Sandusky scandal were the boys assaulted by the former Nittany Lion assistant
football coach. Each of the more specific forces introduced above seemed to allow
for these victims to be silenced or even partially eliminated from local
consciousness.

The Siege Mentality: Who Are the Real Victims?

As the Sandusky scandal developed and began to be digested by different
audiences, a phenomenon known colloquially as “siege mentality” began to manifest
itself equally as a symptom of and evidence for the divide in reception in/out of the
immediate Penn State community. Siege mentality can be most simply understood as the
initial formation and subsequent opposition of an in-group and external communities.15 It
.

is manifested in the perspective of insiders perceiving the rest of the world to constantly
be attacking, oppressing, or isolating members of their specific institution: “...the content
of Siege Mentality belief refers to perception of group members that the outgroups have
intentions to do wrong or inflict harm on their group...Thus, Siege Mentality should be
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viewed as reflecting...such beliefs as ‘No-one will help us in time of need,’ ‘The world
should be glad to get rid of us,’ ‘We cannot rely on others advice,’ and so on” (Bar-Tal &
Antebi 1). The Penn State community responded to the Sandusky scandal with the belief
that outgroups existed to threaten their reputation and existence. Therefore, the
community felt the need to reify their connections to one another in order to survive an
assault on their ideology and culture.
Countless theorists have recognized siege mentality in the realm of sports,
religion, and politics, amongst many others, but the response to the Sandusky scandal is a
clear example. The two primary characteristics of siege mentality evident following the
2011 reveal of years of administrative cover-up of Sandusky’s crimes are the transference
of victimhood onto several, perhaps undeserving parties, and vehement attacks against
those perceived as threatening to the Nittany Lion community. In this situation, during
which control of the narrative became the ultimate goal of so many individuals, the
credibility of parties like the NCAA and Louis Freeh’s investigative team were attacked
while Joe Paterno, Penn State University, the Nittany Lion Football Program, and the
students of the university themselves claimed the role of victim. Each of these forces,
which were difficult to scrutinize from within an ideologically homogeneous Penn State
community, led to the redemption narrative largely denied to the true victims of
Sandusky’s transgressions, the boys who were sexually abused.
Louis Freeh can certainly be pinpointed as the single individual put under the
most fire by the Penn State community for his investigation into the scandal. As
discussed previously, the product of this investigation, universally referred to as the
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“Freeh Report,” criticized Joe Paterno, Gary Schultz, Graham Spanier and Tim Curley
for their, “total and consistent disregard … for the safety and welfare of [JERRY]
Sandusky's child victims” (Freeh 14). As siege mentality theory anticipated, the direct
allegations launched in the Freeh Report were not met with positive response in State
College. Although Louis Freeh, as the former Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations, was absolutely qualified for this investigation, countless Penn State
community members refused to accept the conclusions of this outsider-becomescapegoat. In fact, Penn State alumni such as Ray Blehar (Class of 2008) and Eileen
Morgan (Class of 1990) (along with the organization, Penn Staters for Responsible
Stewardship) went so far as to publish scathing critiques of Freeh’s assessment of the
situation.16 Blehar went on record critiquing Freeh’s investigation for its “bias,” deeming
his final report nothing more than “FactFreeh Fiction.” The Paterno family, following the
death of Joe Paterno, also commenced their own investigation into Freeh’s process,
hoping to undermine the credibility of both Freeh and his analysis. In an official
statement following the removal of Joe Paterno’s statue from outside of Beaver Stadium,
the Paterno family stated, “We believe the only way to help the victims is to uncover the
full truth. The Freeh report, though it has been accepted by the media as the definitive
conclusion on the Sandusky scandal, is the equivalent of an indictment -- a charging
document written by a prosecutor -- and an incomplete and unofficial one at that”
(Rittenberg 1). Louis Freeh responded to this attempted legal and rhetorical ambush in
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the following way, “I respect the right of the Paterno family to hire private lawyers and
former government officials to conduct public media campaigns in an effort to shape the
legacy of Joe Paterno. However, the self-serving report the Paterno family has issued
today does not change the facts established in the Freeh Report or alter the conclusions
reached in the Freeh Report” (Freeh 1). Although Freeh’s comments here appear to be
much more measured than some of the allegations made against him by members of the
Penn State community, they were unlikely to have much effect against the self-protective
narratives emerging from Penn State. After all, Freeh and his team were nothing more
than unwanted outsiders. One can also presume that a majority of this network
(represented by individuals like Blehar, Morgan, and the Paterno family) saw outsiders as
hostile. As Bar-Tal and Antebi remark, “The characterization [of Siege Mentality]
implies that a significant majority of group members hold the belief about negative
intention of the world as a central belief attributing to it high confidence” (Bar-Tal and
Antebi 1). Thus, the siege mentality in State College in the wake of the Sandusky scandal
could be viewed as a nearly insurmountable force for investigators like Freeh and those
assigned the task of reprimanding the perpetrators (the NCAA).
The second component of the siege mentality that was manifested in Happy
Valley was the transference of victimhood. As David Brooks mentioned in The New York
Times, the Siege Mentality, “...gives people a narrative to express their own superiority:
We may be losing, but at least we are the holy remnant. We have the innocence of
victimhood. We are martyrs in a spiteful world” (Brooks 2). This mechanism was
employed in several cases following the Sandusky scandal, as certain actors presented
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Penn State University, its students, its football program, and its head coach as the true
“victims.” This perception of an external vendetta also embodied the gendered and
sexualized fears of our culture at large. The true victims of the Sandusky scandal, the
boys Jerry Sandusky raped, were not properly acknowledged by a majority of Penn State
supporters because of the taboo (for example, homosexual and symbolically incestuous)
implications this recognition would elicit.
With this conception of the university as the real victim of the Sandusky scandal
in place, it is important to return to the euphemistic dialogue surrounding the assaults as
they transpired and were kept from the public and police. Towards the top of the
linguistic smokescreen employed by Penn State officials, President Graham Spanier
decided that Sandusky should be reprimanded for “improper use of university
facilities.”17 The rhetoric used here by the Penn State University president situates the
university as the party most under attack and it hides Sandusky’s real crime entirely. Not
only does this comment convey that Sandusky is not at all a threatening figure, but it may
also lead the public to question what the need to punish him was at all. It is nothing short
of shameful that Spanier opted to minimize Sandusky’s crimes to the point where he
could be equated to someone bringing food into a training room (or any other minor
example of improperly used athletic facilities). Even before the cover-up was exposed to
the public, siege mentality was causing university officials to shirk responsibility and
minimize culpability.

Krisen Lucas and Jeremy P. Fyke, “Euphemisms and Ethics: A Language-Centered Analysis of Penn
State’s Sexual Abuse Scandal.”
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This was also manifest in the treatment of Penn State students and the football
program as victims. This began following the NCAA’s decision to fine Penn State $60
million, impose a scholarship reduction and four-year postseason ban, as well as vacate
all wins the Penn State football team earned under the tenure of Jerry Sandusky. In videos
of students learning about these punishments, a heavy majority of students can be seen
gasping, groaning, or with jaws dropped. While one student interviewed by the Big Ten
Network judged it, “sad and wrong to punish people who had nothing to do with it,”
others were left speechless by the NCAA’s ruling. 18
Most of all, the boys who were raped by Sandusky were unconsciously denied the
role of victims in the wake of the scandal because the position was already taken by (or
tactically given to) Joe Paterno. Paterno was deemed a martyr by his family and the larger
Penn State community. He also embraced the role himself, performing as a victim on
several occasions. Beginning with responses apart from the coach’s, thousands of
students expressed their frustration with the university’s decision to fire Paterno and the
NCAA’s choice to take away so many of “his” wins by taking to the streets and causing
significant damage to downtown State College during a series of impassioned riots. 19
Public displays of disgust continued when Paterno’s statue was removed by order of
interim university president Rodney Erickson because it constituted a “recurring wound”
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and “obstacle to healing.”20 In addition to public gatherings, Paterno’s role as the
injured/attacked party also led to widespread support of things like the 409 campaign. 21
The number 409 can still be seen all throughout State College as a way to display the
number of wins Paterno earned as a head coach and should be credited with by the
NCAA. One Penn State student effectively summarized the sentiment of much of the
student body with regard to Paterno’s removal: “ever since I was born I’ve lived and
breathed Penn State. All I’ve known is Joe Paterno being the head coach. It’s not right if
he won’t be there” (Big Ten Network 2011). In much the same way, the Paterno family
themselves went to great lengths (especially following Paterno’s death) to redeem him
from any responsibility. Brooks also explains how siege mentality can breed behavior
like that of Penn State students and Paterno’s family: “The siege mentality also excuses
the leader’s bad behavior. When our very existence is on the line we can’t be worrying
about things like humility, sexual morality, honesty and basic decency. In times of war all
is permissible. Even molesting teenagers can be overlooked because our group’s survival
is at stake” (Brooks 2). All in all, Paterno was perceived by the State College community
as a quasi-religious figure, and therefore, was deemed a victim undeserving of blame by
all who worshipped his team.
Additionally, Paterno’s own actions following his removal as coach demonstrate a
performative desire to be viewed as martyr. During several of the student gatherings
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following Paterno’s firing, students ended their nights by congregating outside of the
Paterno home on McKee Street in State College to show their support for the wrongly
treated coach. Paterno greeted these students several times, beginning his speeches with
comments like: “We still got things to do. I’m out of it, maybe, now if they put me out of
it, but we’ll go from there,” and “Get some rest. Go support the football team on
Saturday. Beat Nebraska!” (Paterno 2011). These comments reveal a lot about how siege
mentality functions. The former is a clear appeal for a bit of sympathy from his student
body (thus positioning himself as a victim). The latter, on the other hand, attempts to rally
support for a football program he is no longer a part of (perhaps to remind people that the
team is what really matters). In neither case does Paterno acknowledge the boys who
were assaulted by Sandusky until after turning his back to leave the crowd. In these
statements, the true victims of Sandusky’s were treated as an afterthought, far less
important than the targeted coach.
It is also necessary to analyze how Penn State’s siege mentality continued to
dominate the community’s response on a mythological level. Specifically, it allowed the
Penn State University Football Program to write a redemption narrative tethered to the
idea of “us” versus “them.” Countless coaches, players, and journalists involved with
Penn State football have grown fond of mentioning how the team has “beaten the odds”
or “shocked the world” for their ability to win a Big Ten Conference championship
(2016) and Fiesta Bowl title (2017) in such a short time following the “unfair” or “harsh”
reparations levied by the NCAA (which were largely softened over time). Along with
this, some Nittany Lion players were honored with the status of “legend” for the
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character they showed in remaining on the team following the NCAA punishments rather
than transferring. One such individual, Michael Mauti, is specifically referred to in State
College as a football “legend,” although he does not rank remarkably high historically in
any of Penn State’s statistical categories. This rhetoric depends for its effect on the fact
that a team cannot “beat the odds” unless the odds are stacked against them. Without
accepting the role of falsely-accused victim, a team can never rise from the ashes to
regain its heroic status (and all the power that comes with it). Thus, siege mentality has
bled into events which can technically be categorized as outside of the scope of the
Sandusky scandal. Interestingly enough, this redemption narrative was something never
afforded to the boys assaulted by Sandusky (at least, not in the State College community).
While some of the victims have gone on to publish moving accounts of their experiences
and be interviewed by major media outlets, they will always only be recognized as
“Victim One, etc.” or a blue ribbon sitting in the former position of Coach Sandusky (to
signify child abuse) on a downtown mural in State College. On one hand, this fact alone
shows just how much the siege mentality has taken root for Penn State supporters, as the
boys are actually only explicitly identified as “victim” but still have their role overtaken
by other figures and entities. On the other, it shows that they do not have the cultural
might to “beat the odds” in the context of the Penn State community due to the fact that
they are largely swallowed up by the very same siege mentality sentiment that the crimes
committed against them stirred up.
To summarize, siege mentality was clearly demonstrated in Penn State circles
following the Sandusky scandal. It is no wonder that a belief in widespread assault on a
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beloved in-group was adopted by this faction, as Brooks explains the utility of such a
concept in the following way, “It gives them a clear sense of group membership and a
clear social identity. It offers a ready explanation for the bad things that happen in life”
(Brooks 2). Adopting an emotional and rhetorical approach anchored in the fetishization
of the few (as victim or perpetrator) allowed for the breathtakingly self-involved and
insensitive appropriations of victimhood by Penn State and Joe Paterno. Rather than
interrogate the program’s responsibility for the awful crimes that occurred, the Nittany
Lion faithful did as most groups would, and latched onto a more palatable narrative of
battle for ideological superiority to keep a major component of their own identity from
being corrupted. As Penn State professors Laurie Mulvey and Sam Richards put it in their
classroom lecture on responses to the scandal:
Human beings, college students, Penn Staters in particular, invest
an extraordinary amount of personal energy into everything that is
this school around them. You all come here. This isn’t just Penn
State. ‘This is my identity’...Some of what we’re dealing with, that
loss and grief that some of you feel, is that sense that something
deep has been taken away from you. Something has been taken
away from your identity (Shontz 3).
It may, in fact, have been the aim of so many adopting a siege mentality in State
College to prevent this “something” from being taken away from their identities.

Gender: Associative Emasculation of the “Unspeakable” Offense

Another means to analyze the community-wide repression and carefully
constructed understanding of the Sandusky scandal within the Penn State population
involves gender, sexuality, and masculinity. When using these categories, the specifics of
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Sandusky’s crime itself become increasingly powerful in their ability to condition
behavior. Not only were Sandusky’s assaults blatant legal wrongdoings, but they were
also violations of implicit codes of heteronormativity in a hyper masculine athletic
environment. Consequently, Penn State’s football program was stained more by its
affiliation with Sandusky’s homosexual acts than it may have been in an instance of fraud
or misconduct in recruiting. The nature of Penn State’s scandal prevented the institution
from falling into the long line of scandals in big-time collegiate athletic programs. Rather
than “fit in” with institutions like Miami (improper benefits), Boston College (point
shaving), and Michigan (paying players), Penn State was more harshly looked upon by
the sporting world which now held the perception of PSU football as weaker or nonmasculine. In such an environment, where the dominance of one type of masculinity over
any other is fetishized to an unmistakable degree, Sandusky’s repeated sexual assaults on
male youth (which positioned the coach in a homosexual role) were bound to have
significant repercussions in terms of community level reaction as well.
In order to fully understand the gendered implications of the Sandusky scandal,
we must address the inseparability of football and machismo attitudes. In Mariah Burton
Nelson’s, The Stronger Women Get, the More Men Love Football, the acclaimed
journalist, speaker, and sports writer explains the obvious signification of sports as
masculine endeavors: “Sports are male; to be male, and to earn male privilege, one must
enter the sporting arena. A boy watches a baseball game on T.V. not because it is
inherently interesting but because he is desperately seeking Daddy -- if not a real Daddy,
then the idea of Daddy: male authority” (Burton Nelson 106). However, this male
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authority, according to Burton Nelson, is not without its quirks. While it is true that bigtime sport has long been constructed, at least for men, as a quest for a level of machismo
unbridled by female interference (which can be understood as a weakening/tainting
force), Burton Nelson is careful to remind her readers that sports are also invaluable for
men due to their ability to give them a safe arena for emotional displays. Shortly after
discussing male authority, she remarks: “While sport offers a man a place to worship
traditional manhood, paradoxically it also offers a man a place to loosen the rigid
masculine role without losing status. In sports, men can exhibit emotions for other men”
(Burton Nelson 115). The performative aspects of sport, while dripping with testosterone,
are not without a level of latent homosociality. In a way, this careful balance between
thinly veiled, yet acceptable, homosocial behavior and brutish indulgence in pure male
power sets up an understanding of football that has become normalized over decades of
competition. This concept of normalization or the creation of a master narrative
surrounding acceptable male behavior in the world of athletics relates quite strongly to
the theoretical anchor of Judith Butler’s essay, “Critically Queer”:
Gender is...the effect of a regulatory regime of gender differences
in which genders are divided and hierarchized under constraint.
Social constraints, taboos, prohibitions, threats of punishment
operate in the ritualized repetition of norms...for the subject only
comes into intelligibility through the matrix of gender. Indeed, one
might construe repetition as precisely that which undermines the
conceit of voluntarist mastery (Butler 22).
This shows how hegemonic social mechanisms effectively condition the behavior and
gender performance of all individuals. By analyzing Burton Nelson’s aforementioned
observations through a Butlerian lens, one can begin to construct a fairly refined
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conceptualization of how males are permitted to behave in a sporting context without
subjecting themselves to policing. While, in a sense, the widespread tolerance of a certain
amount of homosociality on the playing field does, as Burton Nelson describes, allow
men an opportunity to dodge particular emotional and performative expectations (if only
while competing), it is vital to remember that this slack can only given up to a certain
threshold in specific contexts. For example, spectators would certainly raise no issue at
the sight of their beloved athletes holding hands or locking arms in solidarity during a
dramatic moment in a contest. However, backlash would inevitably ensue should these
same men celebrate a tremendous victory with a kiss. Additionally, as Burton Nelson
points out, the sporting world will only allow mild homosocial performance in the wake
of masculine violence (Burton Nelson 123). In this way, recognition of this macho
violence and prowess which takes place in the realm of excessive heteronormativity (for
example, in the presence of half-naked cheerleaders and bookended by beer ads) helps
spectators to swallow the pill that is homosociality.
In the case of Jerry Sandusky, the former Nittany Lion assistant coach’s
transgressions were deemed unacceptable (beyond their understanding as rape carried out
on powerless young boys) for their performative manifestations. Although several of the
assaults took place in the showers, a long-accepted venue of homoerotically suggestive
dialogue and action, the overt sexuality of them went way beyond towel snapping or, to
put it in Sandusky’s words, “horseplay.” Thus, the homosexuality of Sandusky’s actions
certainly violated normalized understandings of action acceptability rooted in governing
notions of performative gender discourse. However, this explains neither why the crimes
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were perceived differently in/out of Happy Valley nor why they were met with silence,
diversion, and/or repression in the Penn State community. To get a firm grasp on the
particular motivating forces of these outcomes, it is necessary to return to Burton
Nelson’s writing on male-centered sports:
To affiliate with the biggest, strongest males...is symbolically to
reduce the risk of male-on-male violence; to align oneself with the
winning team is to acquire ‘protection’...By taking a ringside seat
in the sports-war spectacle, men and boys may obtain a sense of
collective male power (Burton Nelson 109).
It is no stretch to assume that members of the Penn State community (especially the
males) looked to the university’s football team to provide for them this vicarious form of
power. Unfortunately for them, this affiliation could have been largely corrupted by the
observation of “one of their own” acting in a “reproachable” way sexually. Thus,
Sandusky’s deviant behavior not only corrupted the masculine sanctity of the Penn State
Football Program’s immediate members, but also symbolically emasculated countless
individuals who knowingly or unknowingly tethered a portion of their identity to the
Nittany Lions. Such emasculation inevitably would come as traumatic to these
community members, thus motivating a certain existential or identity crisis. Eve
Sedgwick discusses this notion of “homosexual panic” in Between Men when she
addresses any given individual’s internal fear of the arbitrary and often-terroristic
policing of heteronormativity (Sedgwick 89). As fans of the Penn State Football Program
likely began to pick up on the implied affiliation with Jerry Sandusky that came with
their living vicariously through the Nittany Lions, they may have experienced
Sedgwick’s conception of homosexual panic first hand. Hence, this logically could have
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led to a community-wide shifting of focus away from Sandusky’s crimes themselves in
exchange for a cathexis anchored in love of Joe Paterno and hatred for the NCAA and
Louis Freeh. These easily observable actions themselves, when analyzed through the lens
of gender theory, can be classified as defense mechanisms employed by members of the
Penn State community to quell internal panic and prohibit external policing.
While Sedgwick makes countless brilliant rhetorical gestures in Between Men,
one of the most powerful is directly applicable to the Penn State community’s reaction to
news of Sandusky’s acts:
To put it in twentieth-century American terms, the fact that what
goes on at football games, in fraternities, at the Bohemian Grove,
and at climactic moments in war novels can look, with only a
slight shift of optic, quite startlingly ‘homosexual,’ is not most
importantly an expression of the psychic origin of these institutions
in a repressed or sublimated homosexual genitality. Instead, it is
the coming to visibility of the normally implicit terms of a coercive
double bind. For a man to be a man’s man is separated only by an
invisible, carefully blurred, always-already-crossed line from being
‘interested in men’ (Sedgwick 89).
Interestingly enough, this quotation echoes Butler and Burton Nelson’s conceptions of
acceptability of gender performance. Its ties to homosexual panic also help to illuminate
the processes at work in conditioning how many reacted to the Sandusky scandal. Simply
put, Sandusky’s actions took the “invisible” or “carefully blurred” characteristics of the
spectrum of male behavior (including homosociality and homosexual behavior) and
brought them into the light of immediate public attention and scrutiny. Suddenly, the
homosocial actions common in the realm of sports were to become obvious and,
potentially, negatively marked. Therefore, Sandusky’s crime effectively tarnished not
only the machismo of Penn State and their fans, but also threatened the patriarchal nature
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of football writ large. Sedgwick utilizes Heidi Hartmann’s definition of patriarchy in
Between Men, “relations between men, which have a material base, and which, though
hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable
them to dominate women” (Sedgwick 3). This definition provides yet another example of
what exactly was at stake for the Penn State Football Program and its supporters when
word of the cover-up broke. Sandusky’s actions can be perceived using gender theory as
nothing more than “unnatural” acts which threatened football’s ability to reify patriarchal
values and Penn State’s perception as a strong and dominant athletic program.
Beyond issues of masculinity at play in the conditioning of the local response to
Sandusky’s crimes, the inability, or lack of desire, to accurately name Sandusky’s crimes
must also be analyzed. Sedgwick also discusses the “unspeakability” surrounding
homosexual performance: “Sexuality between men had, throughout the Judaeo-Christian
tradition, been famous among those who knew about it at all precisely for having no
name -- ‘unspeakable,’ ‘unmentionable.’ Of course, its very namelessness, its secrecy,
was a form of social control” (Sedgwick 94). During the years of cover-up and
subsequent testimony of the major players involved in the Sandusky scandal, this
“unmentionable” nature of Sandusky’s actions manifested itself as the propagation of
euphemistic language surrounding the crime. While it is undoubtedly important to
understand the role vague reporting language played during the years of Penn State
coaches and officials attempting to keep the assaults under wraps, such language could
also be latched onto by the larger university network as a means for defense. The work of
Kristen Lucas and Jeremy P. Fyke serves as a significant contribution to the
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understanding of the impact of phrases like “over the lines,” “horsing around,” “activity
in the shower area,” and “something was going wrong” (among many others) on the
scandal. As stated by the authors, “...euphemistic language impairs ethical decisionmaking, particularly by framing meaning and visibility of acts, encouraging mindless
processing of moral considerations, and providing a shield against psychological and
material consequences” (Lucas and Fyke 551). Each of these ramifications of the
employment and repetition of euphemistic language are present in the cover-up and
applied to analysis of responses to the cover-up. Not only would the proliferation of
inexact phrasing allow community members to pardon certain actors in the scandal (for
example “Paterno did not really understand what was going on”), but it would allow
them a certain amount of ethical wiggle room which, in turn, further veils Sandusky’s
rapes for the sake of rhetorical palatability. Essentially, euphemistic language, likely born
from the general discomfort with naming homosexual (and especially violent
homosexual) acts, aided in the dissociation Penn State community members employed in
regard to Sandusky’s actions and their ramifications for the football team. Indirectly, the
widespread acceptance of double-speak demonstrated a public desire to rhetorically
police heteronormativity by acknowledging that deviance was being approached.
Therefore, psychologically burdensome repression of the scandal (outlined above) can be
eased by the employment of language as a defense mechanism by shifting victims,
obscuring actions, and relieving mythological heroes of culpability (adopting and
acceptance of vague language much easier than ignorance). Just as the employment of
euphemistic language helped Penn State officials to internally contain Sandusky’s
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assaults (by allowing them to exert social control), its acceptance in Happy Valley
exemplified the public becoming complicit in the construction of a new rhetoric serving
the purpose of suppressing social problems.
The usage of euphemistic language can also be connected back to masculinity and
sexuality by way of Sedgwick’s theoretical writing on triangulation. Essentially,
triangulation refers to the presence and positioning of a woman in literature or the real
world to quell anxieties about homosociality. To put it into the context of football, all of
the seemingly unacceptable male-male interactions that take place on the field are made
“okay” or are “negated” by the presence of scantily clad cheerleaders (operates similarly
to violence). In this way, all homosocial tension can be either ignored or diverted to a
female sex object, thus allowing for the preservation of hegemonic gender expectations.
In the case of Sandusky, the former Nittany Lion defensive coordinator could be
subjected to public scrutiny for what could realistically be perceived as both homoerotic
and incestuous performances in a football setting (as the player-coach relationship
mirrors father-son relationship). However, these visibly unacceptable homoerotic and
incestuous tensions were deflected, or triangulated, by Sandusky’s young male victims.
By assaulting these boys, Sandusky established a Sedgwickian triangle between himself,
his players/coaching colleagues, and the boys themselves. He chose to operate in a
manner that simultaneously silenced and feminized young male bodies in order to defuse
deviant sexual tension. Unfortunately for Sandusky, and Penn State fans everywhere, he
did not prey upon actual female bodies, like those of cheerleaders (although even this is
clearly a horrible thought). Precisely because the boys being mentored by Sandusky also
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represented homoerotic and incestuous desire, they could not be discussed. This is
exactly where euphemistic language returns to the equation. The vague language
surrounding Sandusky’s transgressions represented a collective attempt to “make things
okay” or put back together the dominant gender discourse Sandusky blew to pieces.
Along with this, a second level or iteration of deflection had to occur at a
community level. Just as the victims themselves were once positioned and feminized in a
way that would deflect homoerotic tension, they too had to be silenced and replaced in
their own role as victims. Just as was mentioned in previous discussions of siege
mentality, it is important to note here how other stand-ins for the role of “victim” were
necessary for the Penn State community to handle the trauma they were exposed to (for
example, Paterno, local economy, etc.). In fact, this transference of victimhood proved to
be remarkably powerful, as individuals named “Victim One, Victim Two,” and so on
were largely not recognized as such in State College. In summary, a two-tiered deflection
of sexual tension was at play during Sandusky’s rapes and their unveiling. First, malemale homosocial and homosexual tensions had to be deflected from Sandusky and his
players/coaching colleagues by his chosen sex objects. By choosing to transfer this morepublic tension into assaults of young male boys, Sandusky effectively set up another
problematic sexual relationship. Therefore, Penn State officials and community members
had to replace the actual victims of the violent crimes with ones that would not cause a
panic in the realm of gender expectations. In doing so, the State College community
enacted a secondary deflection (or replacement following deflection) for their own wellbeing.
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In conclusion, theory regarding gender, sexuality, and masculinity can be applied
rather easily to the context of Happy Valley’s response to the Penn State scandal both to
describe why people would want to psychologically eliminate the problem (associative
emasculation and threats to the patriarchy) and how they went about doing so (adopting
euphemistic language). The Nittany Lion fan base, after symbolically being emasculated
by association with Sandusky, were aware of the fact that their power and prestige could
be targeted by fans of other programs or outsiders more generally (fear of being lumped
in not only with a criminal, but a sexually deviant criminal). Once the potential for Jerry
Sandusky as a metonymy for the entire population of Penn State supporters was
generated, anxiety over Penn State’s iteration of a hegemonic patriarchy being assaulted
by outsiders (possibly subconscious anxiety) clearly conditioned behavior and
understanding of the scandal. Thus, there was more at stake for Penn State football fans
than their counterparts in other parts of the country. The confluence of theoretical
constructs of gender, sexuality, and masculinity, when encountered in the real world,
proved to be yet another remarkably powerful factor in divergent responses to
Sandusky’s assaults.

The Financial Engine

Analyzing the forces responsible for governing the behavior of Penn State
supporters following the Sandusky scandal would be incomplete without a discussion of
economic factors. As is the case in many other college towns housing elite athletic
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programs, the local economy of State College, Pennsylvania and surrounding
municipalities is strongly affected by the local football team. Beyond the direct
expenditures of the football program itself, the financial engine that is Penn State football
is an important generator for indirect local economic activity. During home football
weekends, hotels for miles around State College are packed, restaurants are flooded with
activity, gas stations see an uptick in demand, and other local businesses are treated to
increased foot traffic (Kistner n.p.). Additionally, property owners in and around State
College have begun to use platforms like Airbnb to list and rent their homes to out-oftown Nittany Lion fans on home football Saturdays.
Understanding just how valuable the Penn State University Football Program is to
the economies of State College and its neighboring communities was the task of a 2009
economic impact study commissioned by the university and conducted by Tripp Umbach
& Associates. The findings of this study (of business volume, tax revenue, and
employment impact) are nothing short of staggering, as the Pittsburgh-based consulting
firm found the “total business volume” of Penn State football to be $161.5 million during
that year. More specifically, out of state visitors to Happy Valley spent $51.1 million
during football season ($34.1 million of that in Centre County). The study also found that
Penn State football generated approximately $690,000 in taxes for Centre County alone
($5.7 million for Pennsylvania) and created 2,147 jobs (1,130 directly tied to the team
and 1,017 related to local business staffing). 22 These astonishing numbers are
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corroborated by the accounts many local officials and business owners. One such
business owner, Jimmy Bellis, manager of Wegman’s Food Markets in State College,
mentions that during football season, “Our catering business picks up tremendously. It
creates a lot of fun and excitement for both our customers and employees” (Kistner n.p.).
It is also worth noting that a majority of local businesses adorned their storefronts with
signs reading “Proud to Support Penn State Football” in the wake of the Sandusky
scandal. Clearly, the owners of these businesses are aware of just how much the health
and good standing of the football program means to their bottom lines. Interestingly
enough, very few, if any, businesses in the State College area could be found expressing
support for victims of child abuse following the scandal. Rather than implementing some
sort of support for victims, they created new ways to make money by launching
campaigns centered around the town’s designated martyr, Joe Paterno (409 campaign
sells magnets, shirts, and other memorabilia). The promotion of these advertisements by
local businesses exemplified the beginning of a cultural impact of financial anxieties.
Yet another example of the Penn State football program proving itself a valuable
asset to local workers and companies comes in the form of a relatively recent facilities
arms race across the country at major college football hubs. According to Mark Yost,
“Penn State completed a renovation of Beaver Stadium in 2001 that increased seating
from about 93,000 to more than 107,000, making it the second-biggest facility in college
sports” (Yost 101). Beaver Stadium has undergone several transformations since then, all
requiring massive undertakings in terms of labor and supplies. While it is true that these
renovations were primarily planned by agencies located outside Happy Valley, the actual
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implementation of projects would certainly be an endeavor contracted out to local
construction firms. In this way, Penn State football, through its desire to possess the most
grandiose cathedral for college football in the nation, has helped to generate enormous
amounts of economic activity.
Beyond local shop owners displaying support for Penn State football in the form
of posters in their windows, former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett also latched
onto economic issues when responding to the Penn State scandal. At a January 2, 2013
press conference held at the Nittany Lion Inn, Corbett announced his plan to sue the
NCAA over the sanctions levied upon the university and its football program. Corbett
primarily cited economic concerns, as he delivered his public address with several local
business owners by his side: “these sanctions are an attack on past, present and future
students of Penn State, the citizens of our commonwealth and our economy… Just as we
stand up every day and fight for the victims, we should stand up and fight for those who
have been punished unfairly… As governor of this state, I cannot and will not stand by
and let it happen without a fight” (Horne n.p.). Comments such as these demonstrate
Corbett employing the now-familiar tactic of transferring victimhood onto seemingly
undeserving parties. Yet again, entities such as the local economy, the Penn State student
body, and the citizens of Pennsylvania are mentioned in the same breath as (and equated
to) the victims of Sandusky’s assaults. Further, the language used by Governor Corbett
while speaking out against the NCAA sanctions is a perfect example of siege mentality as
discussed earlier. The true victims of the Sandusky scandal were again forced to step out
of the spotlight and be replaced by the more popular and palatable merchants of State
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College. Ultimately, Corbett’s suit was a legal and public relations failure. Not only was
the lawsuit quickly thrown out, but NCAA Executive Vice President and General
Counsel Donald M. Remy remarked,
We are disappointed by the Governor’s action today. Not only does
this forthcoming lawsuit appear to be without merit, it is an affront
to all of the victims in this tragedy – lives that were destroyed by
the criminal actions of Jerry Sandusky. While the innocence that
was stolen can never be restored, Penn State has accepted the
consequences for its role and the role of its employees and is
moving forward. Today’s announcement by the Governor is a
setback to the University’s efforts. (Balis n.p.)
Comments of this nature by “outsiders” emphasize the already-obvious divide
between perspectives on the Sandusky scandal and its repercussions. In trying to
rally support for the more popular victims of Sandusky’s crimes, Corbett, as a
political leader responsible for acting on behalf of the community, perfectly
exemplified siege mentality thinking. Notably, the crime he chose to speak about
was the monetary loss and not child abuse. 23
When dealing with the economic impact of Penn State football, it is important to
remember that the actual economic impact suffered by the surrounding community is not
what was driving this lawsuit (for example, less than $1 million in ticket sales was lost
from 2010-11 to 2011-12 seasons). When attempting to pinpoint forces potentially
responsible for motivating community level response to the Sandusky scandal, it is of
much greater significance to understand the local perspective on what has the potential to
happen. Local business owners and employees had no way of knowing how their revenue
In a way, Corbett’s actions represent a certain policing of capitalistic values no different from the football
community’s defense of masculinity and heteronormativity.
23
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streams would be impacted by the Sandusky scandal. However, sentiments expressed like
those by Jimmy Bellis prove that local residents were cognizant of how much business
Penn State football generates and, rationally, would fear the possibility of taking damage
to their profit margins due to the scandal. Thus, it can be said that shop owners displaying
their support for Penn State football and Corbett suing the NCAA for potentially
unleashing local economic devastation are performative examples of negative local
sentiment being directed at outsiders. Due to the fact that there was so much at stake for
the local economy (as well as a level of appreciation for past positive economic impacts
of Penn State football), it is no wonder that so many felt the need to “blind” themselves to
the faults of the program brought to light by individuals like Louis Freeh.
To local business owners, students, and even politicians, economic criteria were
focused on as definitive of one of the “real” scandals of the entire Sandusky affair. When
analyzing the Sandusky saga with this economic “scandal” in mind, an entirely new set of
“victims” are created, as local business owners become positioned as a massively injured
party (similarly to students, fans, and players in other contexts). The ultimate impacts of
this identification of false victims were the elimination of the abused children from view
and Penn State’s responsibility for the consequences of the scandal being repressed.
Additionally, misdirected outrage on the part of local business owners and politicians like
Corbett helps to reveal one of the true purposes of big-time college sports (once the fog
of cliché goals like “character building” is lifted): making money. When institutions like
the NCAA or individuals like Louis Freeh attempt to get in the way of the financial
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engine that is big-time college sports (and in this case, Penn State football) it is not
surprising that they are met with a fury of insults on the part of economic “victims.”
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Fig. 4. University of North Carolina Football Helmet (Image Courtesy of CNN)

CHAPTER THREE

BEYOND BEAVER STADIUM
I mean we’re still National Champions and that’s really what matters the most to me.
UNC undergraduate student Drew Gourley, The News and Observer

Introduction to Comparative Analysis

As polarizing and gripping as the Penn State scandal was for so many in the late
Fall and early Winter of 2011, comparative analysis proves that neither the events
themselves nor reactions to them were at all unique. Both the academic fraud that
recently gripped the University of North Carolina and the serial child abuse that took
place for years in the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston show that the Penn State abuses,
cover-up, and visceral reactions all fall into a predictable pattern of behavior
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characterized by institutional conditioning and group mentality. This chapter will identify
pertinent connections between UNC, PSU, and the Catholic Church in the realm of
collective action and cover-up. Aligning these three ‘incidents,’ as they are so often
called, and illuminating their overlapping characteristics will prove that individuals of all
communities react in a similar way when institutions they identify with become
implicated in a scandal. Use of these defense mechanisms will be shown to happen
regardless of the institution currently handling crisis. Although it is highly unlikely that
events such as these can be avoided in the future, by bringing these nearly universal
defense mechanisms to light, people of all societies can be estranged from their place in
groups. By becoming hypersensitive to the power of their identification with a particular
institution, group members will more readily engage in psychological splitting (not
letting identity or behavior be wholly tied up in groups) when taking stances on
controversial issues. A higher frequency of psychological splitting may ultimately aid in
reducing the frequency of both immoral action and silent bystanders.

The University of North Carolina

The Scandal in a Nutshell:

As early as August 2011, allegations began to circulate regarding University of
North Carolina student athletes being involved in what are now commonly referred to as
“paper classes.” These fake classes began to attract the attention of investigators
following the NCAA declaring in 2010 that former UNC football player Michael
McAdoo (along with some of his teammates) would be permanently ineligible because of
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academic misconduct. A series of investigations between the years 2012 and 2014 found
that nearly 3,100 UNC students (approximately half of these students were athletes,
primarily from the football and men’s basketball teams) had enrolled in fake classes since
they began being offered in 1990 (Wainstein 42). Although non-student-athletes had the
opportunity to take these same classes (as they often found out about them by word of
mouth), athletes represented just under fifty-percent of their enrollment over the years,
which is staggering considering only approximately four-percent of UNC students are
involved in varsity athletics (Wainstein et al 2014). These paper classes, which required
no attendance from class participants over the course of the semester and assessed
students based on a single final paper (which was often highly plagiarized or written
entirely for student athletes by tutors who were allegedly promised UNC tickets and
apparel),24 were offered by the university’s African and Afro-American Studies
department and facilitated by Department Chairman Julius Nyang’oro and AFAM
Student Services Manager Deborah Crowder. 25 The AFAM department was not the only
one to come under fire, as the scandal’s initial “whistleblower,” former UNC learning
specialist Mary Willingham, and UNC professor of history Jay M. Smith also condemned
the university’s drama, geology, and philosophy departments in their 2015 publication
Cheated: The UNC Scandal, the Education of Athletes, and the Future of Big-Time

According to former UNC basketball star Rashad McCants’ 2014 interview for ESPN’s “Outside the
Lines.”
24

25

Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain the racial dimension of the UNC academic
scandal, it is worth mentioning that the African and Afro-American Studies Department being implicated
allows for race to serve the same polarizing effect gender/sexuality did at Penn State.
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College Sports. According to Willingham and Smith, these departments, while not
offering fake classes, did provide easy classes and relaxed assessment standards for UNC
students and student-athletes (Smith & Willingham 34). Willingham also caught the
attention of the media by frequently commenting on the low reading levels (often below
fourth-grade level and sometimes outright illiteracy) and SAT scores of many studentathletes she worked with over the years (Goldberg 2014). After looking into the academic
misconduct at Chapel Hill, the NCAA did not hand down any sanctions to the
university’s athletics department, stating that “[w]hile student-athletes likely benefited
from the courses, so did the general student body. Additionally, the record did not
establish that the university created and offered the courses as part of a systematic effort
to benefit only student-athletes” (Sankey 2017).

The Influence of Big-Time College Sports:

The most apparent tie between the Penn State child abuse scandal and North
Carolina academic scandal is that of premiere athletic programs being involved in
misconduct that went unreported for so long due to their prestige. As celebrated as
football is in Happy Valley, basketball plays a similarly prominent cultural role in Chapel
Hill. Interestingly, for all of the similarities these two occurrences share, they involve
dramatically distinct crimes (child abuse and administrative concealment vs academic
fraud and administrative concealment). In Smith and Willingham’s book on the scandal
at UNC, they remark “Through negligence, willful blindness, and some degree of
conscious intent, key actors at the university first permitted the development of
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widespread academic fraud and then covered up the reasons behind that fraud when the
wrongdoing at last came to light” (Smith & Willingham xiv). This broad description of
the underpinnings of the UNC academic scandal follows a very similar trajectory to the
Sandusky scandal. The fact that the crime itself can be rendered almost “irrelevant,” as
different ethical lapses were motivated by similar forces, speaks to the apparent
universality of some group dynamics addressed in previous sections of this thesis.
The notion that the importance of an athletic program at a university can breed
unethical behavior on the part of coaches, administrators, players, and fans alike is
nothing new. Countless volumes have been written documenting the moral shortcomings
endemic to the world of big-time college sports. Peter French parses the mission
statements of athletic departments connected to various state universities and concludes
that many major athletic programs define their role as ranging from “molding good
characters in the participating athletes to a fiscal justification to the effect that regularly
putting on a good show, a winning record, on the playing field improves the potential for
raising the level and amount of donations to the institution … making possible higher
levels of support for the traditional academic programs” (French 2). Upon further
examination of the conduct of many big-time athletic departments (like Penn State and
UNC), French comes to the opposite conclusion: “The business of entertainment and all
that entails is what football and men’s basketball, and, to a lesser degree, women’s
basketball is really all about … If that primary mission of those programs is denied or
masked in the rhetoric of academics or ethics education, nothing makes much sense at
all” (French 104). To French and others, it is clear to see that major college sports
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programs operate according to a desire to attract fans, win games, and generate esteem
and financial earnings for their university. This “win-at-all-costs” mentality was on
display at Penn State as coaches and administrators veiled reports of sexual abuse to
protect their football team. Former UNC basketball standout Rashad McCants cited a
similar motivation behind his team taking advantage of paper classes to remain eligible.
In an interview with ESPN, McCants commented, “You’re not there to get an education.
You’re there to make revenue for the college. You’re there to put fans in the seats.
You’re there to bring prestige to the university by winning games” (McCants
n.p.). Clearly, for both the UNC basketball program and PSU football program (along
with most other big-time college sports programs)26, generating “revenue” and “prestige”
for the university by winning games was important enough that moral judgement was
cast aside in order to do so. It was, and always will be, more important than the individual
players, than the boys who were assaulted by Jerry Sandusky, than the academic
reputation of the University of North Carolina, than the coaches and even competition
(opposing teams forced to play against athletes who should be ineligible):
With all the money at stake, the increasingly addictive high quality
sport entertainment on offer, and the ever more deeply entrenched
sporting interests crowding the seats of power at the big- time
universities, the corruption in college athletics took on the
character of an immovable object. The UNC experience would
certainly seem to provide a case in point. In Chapel Hill the instinct
to dig in and stonewall, to cut losses and “move on” so as to return
to athletics business as usual as quickly as possible, was pervasive.
Administrators misled the public and denied the deeper realities of
which the individual wrongs of tutors, players, and professors were
only symptoms. Students on campus remained apathetic and
Another powerful example is brought to light in Jon Krakauer’s Missoula: Rape and the Justice System
in a College Town (2015).
26
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detached throughout the saga. Faculty leaders either ignored the
institutional risks posed by the imperative to succeed athletically or
celebrated small- bore reform measures that only underscored
UNC’s avoidance of bold action. With the exception of the Raleigh
News & Observer, local media showed by their stubborn
indifference to the scandal that they valued their continuing access
to Athletic Department insiders more than they valued the public’s
right to know the truth. Resignation (or happy compromise) in the
face of the athletic machine was the default setting in and around
UNC - Chapel Hill between 2010 and 2014 (Smith & Willingham
239-40).
This passage presents what exactly is at stake for an athletic program, a
university, and a local community when it comes to situations like those being
analyzed here. For any actor (student, journalist, administrator, coach, player, etc.)
to both recognize and condemn the unethical behavior that has plagued college
athletics for so long would be to deny him or herself all of the benefits that can be
generated by the athletic machine. While this is a simple concept, it has become
so pervasive in American collegiate athletic culture that it must be addressed.
Additionally, these same identity politics and potential benefits for affected
individuals help to explain just how easy it is for members of other collegiate
athletic communities to point fingers at other institutions, all while their own
program may well be mired in infractions.

The Involvement of Legendary Coaches:

A second obvious parallel between the scandals at Penn State and North Carolina
is the alleged involvement of legendary coaches. Joe Paterno’s status as both an icon and
legend in Happy Valley is mirrored in the Tar Heels’ head men’s basketball coach, Roy
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Williams. After a decade of being groomed as the successor to Dean Smith (another
Carolina hoops legend), Williams actually accepted a head coaching position in the
equally famous Kansas University basketball program in 1988. After having incredible
success leading the Jayhawks, including two national championship game appearances
and an .805 winning percentage, Williams returned to his alma mater in 2003 to become
the head coach of the UNC men’s basketball team. Since returning, Williams has accrued
423 wins (his 400 coming against Bucknell on November 15, 2017) to go along with his
th

418 victories at Kansas. Also, Williams has led three separate Tar Heels squads to NCAA
National Championship Game wins (2005, 2009, 2017). While the UNC academic
scandal did indirectly involve a high-profile coach in Williams, he was never directly
implicated in the academic fraud by an officially-conducted investigation (although his
former player, McCants did mention in several interviews that Williams was aware of the
misconduct). Also, the UNC scandal did not solely involve one athletic program, as
UNC’s football and women’s basketball teams also reportedly took advantage of paper
classes.
That being said, Roy Williams was not entirely removed from the UNC scandal,
as he often found himself fielding questions from local and national media outlets
pertaining to his involvement. In fact, he even acknowledged in one interview with
ESPN’s Kevin Negandhi that, had he not been such a well-established coach at UNC, he
would not have “survived” the scandal (Williams 2014). This all seemed to begin for
Coach Williams after, as he would put it, his “integrity was attacked” by his former
player Rashad McCants. Although Williams denied the accuracy of his claims
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vehemently, McCants reported to ESPN that he was certain Williams knew about the
fake classes in which his players were enrolled, as well as the plagiarized papers they
were submitting. When given a chance to respond, Williams told ESPN’s Jay Bilas, “I
have no idea. I don’t sit in the class, I don’t turn in their papers. But I find that impossible
to believe” (Williams 2014). In this comment, in which Williams is responding to his
players being allowed to submit plagiarized or poor quality work, the Tar Heel head
coach uses evasive language to distance himself from the scandal as much as possible. In
addition, he made a repeated effort in his interviews to express his commitment to his
players earning their degrees and succeeding in all walks of life. Much like Paterno did
for his players at Penn State, Williams mentioned time and time again that he would
willingly revise practice and travel schedules for his players if their academics were not
properly accommodated.
Over time, Williams became outwardly frustrated when responding to the
seemingly endless string of questions from the media regarding his players’ classroom
experience. It was not before long that, like Coach Paterno, Williams began to position
himself as one of the academic scandal victims. Also while speaking with Negandhi,
Williams eventually arrived at a high point of frustration, “If you wanna talk basketball,
I’ll talk basketball. That other crap is gonna have to be taken care of. We made some
mistakes, we’re not proud of it. I’m very very sad, I’m very very hurt. But I’m not gonna
rehash all that crap. If you wanna talk basketball, we’ll do that. I’ve already had a
hundred million press conferences I think on the other stuff” (Williams 2014). Here,
Williams makes direct reference to the tireless questioning he has been subjected to due
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to the misconduct in the UNC AFAM Department. Although few others described
Williams as an injured party, this self-victimization harkens back to his earlier
mentioning of himself as being under attack by individuals such as McCants. In addition
to assuming the role of victim, which was similarly occupied by Joe Paterno in Happy
Valley, Williams also frequently attempted to rally support for himself while being
interviewed, stating that he would “bleed [Carolina blue] if you cut me open” and had
devoted much of his life, as a player, student, and coach to the University of North
Carolina (Williams 2014). Each of these tactics (self-victimization and reference to
commitment/service to the institution) mitigated his responsibility and echoed Joe
Paterno.
Roy Williams clearly manifested siege mentality by feeling personally slighted by
many of the comments McCants made at his expense and by his growing frustration with
reporters’ attempts to tie him to the academic fraud taking place. Williams’ words and
performances connect him to Paterno easily, as the Nittany Lion coach (and his
passionate legion of supporters) also implied that he was wronged by PSU and certain
reporters. It is no surprise that this shared sense of victimization existed, as the iconic
status of these men within their programs renders it nearly impossible to separate
institutional critiques from personal attacks (for example, Paterno is Penn State football,
so any criticism of the program appears as a slight to him -- the same is true for Williams
at North Carolina).
Williams, like many of Joe Paterno’s supporters in Happy Valley, was also not
shy about pointing fingers and shifting blame for what took place at UNC. The coach was
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adamant in all interviews about his role as a coach not necessarily involving direct checkins about academics. In a press conference held in the wake of the publication of Kenneth
L. Wainstein’s Investigative Report detailing the academic misconduct at UNC (one he
did not entirely agree with), Williams mentioned, “Guys, I think that I would have been
run off if I had tried to go into any department at the university and told them to try to
have a run at it. That’s not my job. I took care of my guys. If there’s something that a
coach doesn’t like he should try to do the right thing. I think I tried to do the right thing”
(Williams 2014). Later in the same press conference, he stressed that he was okay with
his lack of involvement in UNC academics, as he believed in full academic freedom for
professors and would not be happy if professors and administrators began telling him
how to coach his team (Williams 2014). He had “[n]ever known a basketball coach to be
in charge of the university” (Williams 2014). In all of these comments, Williams is quick
to point out that problems with UNC academics are the fault of professors and
administrators, not coaches. He also mentioned that much more could have been done by
the university to prevent this fraud from taking place. In fact, one of his final statements
from that same press conference went as follows: “I wish I would’ve been chancellor for
a day. Maybe I would have solved all of the problems in the world” (Williams 2014).
When under fire, Williams was not only willing to position himself as a loyal Tar Heel
and victim, but also to pass blame off to other university employees.
The true problem created by the involvement of legendary coaches in scandals
such as these is that they serve as nothing more than distractions from both the true
victims of immoral behavior and the institutional shortcomings that facilitate said
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behavior. It is not until successful coaches like Paterno and Williams are treated as
accountable for their programs that we may begin to see change in the world of college
sports when it comes to corruption. In Paterno’s case, his status in the local community
actually absolved him of all blame for his involvement in the scandal in the eyes of his
fans. In the case of North Carolina, although Williams was not actually brought up in
investigations of the academic fraud, few even thought to question the manner in which
he ran his program (for example, academic progress reports, checking grades, following
up with players thoroughly). The enterprise of college sports puts too much emphasis on
winning games, generating revenue, and hanging banners in the rafters. The symptoms of
this attitude seem to be three-fold. First, coaches become so distracted with on-field goals
that they have little time to worry about what their players and colleagues are doing in the
locker room, classroom, or any other arena. Secondly, when certain athletic programs
come under fire, successful coaches oftentimes evade consequence due to their winning
traditions. Finally, the real victims of unethical behavior are always hidden from view, as
men given legendary status simply for winning amateur athletic contests serve as magnets
for public attention, due in part to the manner in which they conduct themselves during a
scandal’s fallout period (for example, self-victimization).

Community Defense:

Analysis of the UNC scandal in relation to the PSU scandal would not be
complete if only conducted from an institutional standpoint. Much like in Happy Valley,
the UNC saga infected the surrounding Chapel Hill community, leading to defensive
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reaction from many students and others affiliated with the university. Individuals
associated with UNC utilized some of the tactics seen just a couple of years prior in
Happy Valley following the Sandusky scandal. These tactics included a siege mentality,
silencing and discrediting the voices of insiders and outsiders speaking out against the
university’s conduct, and outright denial of the conclusions of professional investigations
(not unlike Roy Williams mentioning that he did not agree with all aspects of the
Wainstein Report).
Once word of the long-standing academic fraud in Chapel Hill was broken and a
flurry of voices emerged criticizing the university and its Athletic Department, many
students felt the need to express their feelings of personal victimization at the hands of an
outside world “out to get them.” Many UNC faithful took to social media to tweet about
this unfair external condemnation. One of the most illustrative of these posts, in terms of
siege mentality, read, “So basically, the NCAA held a 5-7-year grudge against UNC
basketball, ruined their recruiting, all to find out they did nothing wrong” (UNC
Gameday 2017). The issue of recruiting was systematically brought up in conversations
with students (Toth 2017) as well as Roy Williams (Hyman 2017) following the
emergence of the scandal. Although the Tar Heels were still able to win a significant
majority of their games, including another National Championship (2017) in the years
following Wainstein’s allegations and other investigations into academic misconduct, Tar
Heel supporters still felt that the bad publicity was being used as a tool by outsiders to
keep strong recruits from committing to play basketball at UNC. All in all, attitudes like
these, when paired with acceptance of victimhood on the part of students, helped to paint
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a clear picture of siege mentality taking hold in Chapel Hill. Following the NCAA’s
announcement not to punish the UNC athletic programs implicated by Wainstein for their
misconduct, students went on record expressing their feelings of relief and that it felt as if
a cloud had been lifted from over the university (Toth 2017). These statements simply
imply that the UNC student body felt personally antagonized by the ongoing NCAA
deliberation, which resulted in nothing more than the encouragement of an “us vs them”
perspective on campus.27
The siege mentality that plagued Chapel Hill in a manner reminiscent of what was
seen at Penn State for so many years clearly involved a heavy dose of anger being
directed by insiders toward those outside the UNC community. The “outside,” however,
was not the only community attacked by those affiliated with UNC, as other insiders with
“unacceptable” opinions on the scandal were silenced at North Carolina much like they
had been in the wake of the Sandusky scandal. Willingham details this process with the
help of Jay M. Smith in Cheated,
...a great many people, including well- informed insiders, have
known for a long time that the system of college sport is badly
broken. Yet college campuses are not exactly teeming with
whistle- blowers and crusaders for reform— and the reasons for the
collective silence are perfectly understandable. The system seeks to
crush those who would make waves, and every ounce of
institutional leverage is mobilized to silence or punish the people
who threaten the golden goose. Mary Willingham was ignored,
shunned, demoted, harassed, publicly humiliated by the
university’s provost, viciously attacked in social media by UNC
faculty and staff, and treated so badly in her new position that she
ultimately felt forced to resign. Sadly, the Willingham example is
all too familiar, as recent outspoken critics of the athletic machines
27

Although some students did express the opinion that the entire institution of college athletics was broken
and deserved to be put under the microscope (Toth 2017).
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at Georgia, Tennessee, Auburn, Minnesota, Florida State, and
Marshall could all attest. Courageous insiders are destined to
remain an endangered species (Smith & Willingham 241).
The behavior of Penn State students at rallies and games, when encountering community
members criticizing PSU football, was therefore not unique at all, but actually very
predictable. Threatening figures are typically cast out as scapegoats by institutions due to
the fact that their very existence and message has the potential to not only bring
punishment but also dismantle a sense of community built sometimes over generations.
The ideological homogeneity, which existed in Happy Valley and Chapel Hill alike, was
one of the largest sources of fuel for emergent scandals and their cover-ups.
Denial, like the other strategies discussed above, is not related to any particular
scandal, but actually is deeply rooted in institutional behavior and community-level
reaction to scandal. In Beer and Circus, Murray Sperber spells this out,
For TV viewers, the perfect mind-set for watching SportsCenter,
particularly when seeing clips from college sports events and
knowing all about the corruption in intercollegiate athletics, was
the equivalent of what George Orwell defined in 1984 as
‘doublethink’: the ability to believe contradictory ideas
simultaneously, for example, acknowledging the dysfunction of
college sports while fervently following its teams and games
(Sperber 42).
Sperber’s point identifies the pervasive cultural problems in the world of college sports.
Even in cases where a high profile athletic program is called into question and found
guilty of certain unethical behavior without a shadow of a doubt, the fans and affiliates of
the program consistently either deny, minimize, or ignore claims made against their
beloved programs. This denial operated in exactly the same manner at Penn State as it did
at North Carolina, and it would not look any different at any other university with a major
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athletic program that has fallen under fire. The psychological splitting that is required of
an individual to not internalize and personalize critiques of institutions they call their own
has long been proven as a remarkably difficult task to carry out. Unfortunately, as was
the case at PSU, few in the UNC community proved capable of pulling off this feat,
leading to the propagation of a largely uniform rhetoric riddled with denial.

Conclusion: College Sports Creating Community

Comparative analysis of these two scandals involving high profile athletic
programs at large public universities serves several purposes. First of all, the comparison
helps to understand the behavior of fans, administrators, students, and others as “normal”
when threats to beloved institutions emerge. In addition, it can also be seen that, because
corruption and reactions to its unveiling are so similar from one context to another, the
world of big-time college sports has generated a culture that frequently leads to unethical
behavior on the part of institutions, administrators, players, and fans. A culture that has
led to many lives being ruined for the sake of ticket sales and wins on the field of play.
Smith and Willingham also address this systematically employed toxic behavior
in their book, “...the pressures and conditions that made the scandal possible… are
endemic to the college-sport enterprise… The incentive to turn a blind eye, to wallow in
denial, is all the greater when high reputations are at stake” (Smith & Willingham 205).
In the cases of PSU and UNC, reputation played a significant role in the rhetoric
surrounding each scandal. Just as the stark contrasts between discourse of insiders and
outsiders could be witnessed at Penn State, so too were different perspectives expressed
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in the UNC context. Less than fifteen miles from Chapel Hill, at North Carolina State
University, students readily criticized the NCAA for not levying sanctions upon the Tar
Heels (a decision that seemed fair in Chapel Hill). NC State undergraduate students (as
well as many other journalists around the country28) expressed the opinion that it was
unfortunate that UNC had gotten away with their academic fraud and that they should
have been punished, although they “all knew they weren’t gonna give them any
punishment” (Willett 2017). By looking at the disharmony that exists between the
discourse of those with and without emotional ties to an institution mired in controversy,
onlookers are given a front row seat to the “pressures and conditions” that are “endemic
to the college-sport enterprise” and, really, all major institutions.
The situations at UNC and PSU show that big-time college sports teams foster a
seemingly unbreakable sense of community for their followers. Even in the face of
heinous allegations, long-term investigations, NCAA sanctions, and firestorms of outside
criticism, fans of teams like the Nittany Lions and Tar Heels remain loyal. Rather than to
do what most outside observers consider “logical” or “rational” (although we have
proven these terms to be problematic) and take issue with the crimes facilitated and/or
committed by their beloved teams, students and fans universally seem to dig in their
heels, close the ranks within the local community, and fight against outsiders they deem
threatening. The unifying force of college sports and their ability to generate immense
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pride within a community can be a wonderful thing, but it can also be dangerous. 29 It is
this same unification and pride in programs that has led to athletic machines
subordinating educational values and the lives of countless victims for market values and
victories (Giroux & Giroux 2012).

The Catholic Archdiocese of Boston

A Crisis in the Archdiocese:

Towards the end of the 20 Century, branches of the Catholic Church across the
th

globe began to fall under scrutiny, as hundreds of allegations of priests sexually abusing
children in the United States and abroad began to surface. In the United States, the
growing scandal played out most prominently in Boston. The Boston saga began in July
2001 when Cardinal Bernard Law admitted to having received a letter in 1984 which
alerted him to allegations involving Father John J. Geoghan’s molestation of children. In
January 2002, Judge Constance Sweeney ordered that Cardinal Bernard Law of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Boston hand over 10,000 pages of church records (NCR Staff
2015). Law’s initial acknowledgement of widespread criminal activity within the
Archdiocese was soon magnified when an investigative team at The Boston Globe used
the records as evidence in a series of articles detailing years of child abuse and
subsequent child endangerment within the Boston Archdiocese. As the initial subject of
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2013).
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The Boston Globe’s Spotlight Team, Geoghan was reported to have sexually abused
nearly 130 individuals over his thirty-year tenure (before being defrocked in 1998), most
of whom were young boys (Rezendes 1). Although Law admitted to knowledge of these
allegations, he oversaw and approved of Geoghan’s transfer to St. Julia’s parish in
Weston (Rezendes 1). After being put on trial and sentenced to 9-10 years in prison on
convictions of molestation, Geoghan was murdered by a fellow inmate in August 2003.
Law officially resigned as the Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Boston in December 2002
but was reassigned to the Basilica di Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome (McCarthy 2015).
Aside from their initial report, the Spotlight Team went on to publish nearly six-hundred
articles pertaining to the abuse scandal in the Catholic Church.
Sadly, Geoghan’s sentencing was only the beginning for the Archdiocese of
Boston, as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General
published a chilling report on July 23, 2003. The document, which will hereafter be
referred to as the “Boston Report,” reported just how severe the child abuse crisis in
Boston’s branch of the Catholic Church had been for years. The report’s most serious
finding was as follows:
Widespread sexual abuse of children was due to an institutional
acceptance of abuse and massive and pervasive failure of
leadership: 1) top Archdiocese officials knew the extent of the
clergy sexual abuse problem for many years before it became
known to the public, 2) the Archdiocese’s response to the reports
of sexual abuse of children, including maintaining secrecy of
reports, placed children at risk, 3) the Archdiocese officials did not
provide all relevant information to law enforcement authorities
during criminal investigations, 4) the Archdiocese did not notify
law enforcement authorities of clergy sexual abuse allegations, 5)
the Archdiocese failed to conduct thorough investigations of clergy
sexual abuse allegations, 6) the Archdiocese placed children at risk
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by transferring abusive priests to other parishes, 7) the Archdiocese
placed children at risk by accepting abusive priests from other
Dioceses, 8) the Archdiocese placed children at risk by transferring
abusive priests to other Dioceses in the United States and abroad,
9) the Archdiocese failed to adequately supervise priests known to
have sexually abused children in the past (Boston Report 2003).
More specifically, the introduction of the report, written by Massachusetts
Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly, mentioned that the Archdiocese had withheld
records containing complaints of sexual abuse from 789 victims (Reilly 1). In
addition, approximately 250 priests and church workers had been accused of
raping or sexually assaulting children over nearly six decades (Reilly 1). Later in
the document, Reilly mentioned his motivations for publishing the report: “The
mistreatment of children was so massive and so prolonged that it borders on the
unbelievable. This report will confirm to all who may read it, now and in the
future, that this tragedy was real” (Reilly 2). In the report, countless senior
members of the Archdiocese of Boston, including Cardinal Bernard Law, Bishop
Thomas Daily, Bishop Robert Banks, Bishop Alfred Hughes, Bishop William
Murphy, and Bishop John McCormack (among others) were mentioned for their
failure to report sexual abuse, transfer of abusive priests to other locations, failure
to investigate allegations of sexual abuse, and inactivity in limiting the roles of
abusive priests who had been evaluated by psychological professionals (Boston
Report 31-9). The report also named ten priests in the Archdiocese who had been
involved in sexual misconduct. In the years following both the Boston Report and
subsequent articles from The Boston Globe’s Spotlight Team, many victims
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continued to come forward as well as take legal action against the Archdiocese of
Boston, leaving it, at times, in financial trouble (NCR Staff 2015).

Religion and Sport:

Scholars have identified and analyzed the parallels between the spheres of
religion and sport for many years. Rebecca Alpert succinctly describes some of them in
Religion and Sports: An Introduction and Case Studies:
Elements such as the special language (my description contains
phrases as incomprehensible to the uninitiated as one finds in any
religious tradition), the fallible hero who makes good, the ritual
celebrations, the connection to a historic tradition, the meticulous
keeping of records, the loyalty of fans across generations, and the
sense of a cosmic connection to something outside oneself—all are
markers of religious experience as it is commonly understood
(Alpert 2).
As Alpert explains, there is perhaps more connecting the cultures of religion and
sport than there is separating them. In the case of Penn State football, several
reporters were quick to draw comparisons between the football program and
religion in the wake of the Sandusky scandal. For example, in an opinion piece
published in the aftermath of Joe Paterno’s firing, Bill Plaschke commented,
...for 46 years it was not really Penn State University, it was
Paterno State University. It was a school that sold its soul to
football coach Joe Paterno for the sake of riches and recognition, a
school that found its identity in his plain uniforms and lived its life
by his corny pep talks. Paterno was allowed to play God, and so his
longtime assistant coach Jerry Sandusky was allowed to do
whatever he wanted, wherever he wanted … Penn State created Joe
Paterno, worshiped Joe Paterno, and stunningly required four long
days to finally throw the phony out into the street Wednesday
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when public furor forced the school's board of trustees to fire him
for not reporting Sandusky to police (Plaschke 1).
By using overtly religious language and implying themes of Christ being
embodied by Paterno (iconic “uniforms” and pep talks as scripture), Plaschke
comments ironically on Penn State’s football culture. It is hard to fault Plaschke
for having this perception of Penn State football culture, as the university
community often embraced and even encouraged this view of their local football
program. From the elevation of their head coach through nicknames like “Saint
Joe,” to a widespread belief in the inherent morality of the program itself, to the
treatment of Paterno’s statue being removed as the denigration of religious
monument, the line between the football program and a religious institution grew
blurrier with each passing season.
The experience of college football in the United States has also been
readily compared to the sacred world by many academics. 30 Indeed, the
apparently ritualistic tailgating and viewing of college football contests on Fall
Saturdays is not dissimilar from weekly attendance at mass or other ceremonial
religious gatherings. Especially in Happy Valley, the quasi-religious feel of
gameday at Beaver Stadium is difficult to ignore, as crowds of fans and students
almost perfectly exemplify what Émile Durkheim called “collective
effervescence” in his ethnographic work focused on Australian tribal religions:
It seems to him that he has become a new being. The decorations
with which he is decked out… represent this inward
30
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transformation...And because his companions feel transformed in
the same way at the same moment, and express this feeling by their
shouts, movements, and bearing, it is as if he was in reality
transported into a special world entirely from the one in which he
ordinarily lives, a special world inhabited by exceptionally intense
forces that invade and transform him (Durkheim 220).
This passage, which could just as easily describe the Penn State student section in Beaver
Stadium as it does a tribal ceremony, helps to demonstrate how the experience of sport
and religion can be linked just as simply as their general culture. Whether individuals are
congregating for religious or athletic purposes, there is no denying the sense of collective
identity that emerges when members of a community come together to participate in a
spectacle of any kind.
While these connections between religion and sport are clear, the tie between the
specific instances of child abuse at Penn State and within the Archdiocese of Boston lies
in how these cultures, as well as public identification with each of them, not only enabled
the transgressions, but also kept them hidden and conditioned responses to the crimes
ultimately being revealed. These two public tragedies share common themes of sexual
marginalization and repression and a shared desire to preserve a reputation of institutional
purity on the part of constituent members. The example of the abuses carried out within
the Archdiocese of Boston was larger in scale and in the resultant public rejection of the
institution at fault, but still manifested denial and distraction in the response of religious
officials like Pope John Paul II. Like the UNC scandal, it serves as another tragic
example of crisis response and collective identity in the context of Penn State’s own child
abuse scandal.
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The Culture of Cover-Up:

It is entirely reasonable to wonder just how knowledge of such abhorrent crimes
could have been kept contained for so long. The simple answer to this question lies in the
power of institutions in conditioning individual behavior. Just as Penn State
administrators sought to conceal Sandusky’s assaults for the sake of preserving a
glorified image of their football program, so too did members of the clergy in the
Archdiocese of Boston. In his discussion of clergy response to sexual abuse allegations,
Paul Dokecki reinforces this point: “This pattern of church actions seems to convey an
overarching message: We must avoid scandal, protect the church’s standing as a ‘sinless’
institution, and preserve our power at any cost. So, in defending against clergy sexual
abuse allegations and suits, the ends justify the means” (Dokecki 78). With so much at
stake for members of the religious order, it is no surprise that they acted to defend their
organization. This behavior was modeled almost perfectly in the Penn State case, as
administrators had no interest in dealing with the degradation to their university that
would come with publicizing Sandusky’s assaults. Thus, they had no choice but to coverup the crime in an attempt to preserve the reputation of their institution.
Beyond the preservation of reputation, the leaders of many groups engaging in
cover-ups justify their behavior as serving the members of their institution. In describing
the culture of concealment within the Archdiocese of Boston, Marie Keenan validates
this feeling of public service, “The approach, based on a ‘theology of scandal,’ implied
that giving scandal would undermine the faith of the people and the credibility of the
Church. Church leaders believed that they must protect the people from being
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scandalized… They believed it was better for everyone if this information did not reach
the public realm” (Keenan 206). In the case of Penn State, administrators likely quelled
moral anxiety stemming from the cover-up by acknowledging how damaged the campus
and broader State College community would be by knowledge of Sandusky’s
transgressions. These justifications are not unique to the Archdiocese of Boston or Penn
State University, as the rationalization of criminal action as beneficial for the community
is a common strategy of the perpetrators of cover-ups.
Those directly involved in the cover-up of criminal behavior are not the only ones
who have the potential to have their behavior governed by institutional interests. In State
College and Boston alike, community members enabled cover-ups through attitudes of
deference to their beloved institutions. The Spotlight Team went to great lengths in their
novel to explain how a largely Catholic population in Boston exemplified these attitudes:
Given the predominance of Irish Catholics in Massachusetts law
enforcement circles, it’s not surprising there had been little appetite
to prosecute priests for anything, including the sexual abuse of
children … It was the same in politics, where the names that
dominated city hall and the State House, and those who
represented the city and state in Washington, were Curley,
McCormack, O’Neill, Flynn, and, most famously, Kennedy
(Spotlight Team 120).
In this passage, the Spotlight Team makes an argument that harkens back to discussion of
the Penn State loyalists. In a community where so many individuals uniformly subscribe
to the ideology of a similar group (Penn State football culture or Catholicism),
interrogation of that same institution is rarely allowed. A lack of intellectual dissonance
in a community may also stem from individuals fearing a loss of the benefits their
institution can provide should they choose to dissent. In the case of the Catholic church
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“children are socialized from their earliest years to see the church (‘mother church’) and
the priest (‘father’) as trusted means to achieving their most important ends -- the
salvation of their immortal soul, the avoidance of eternal punishment in hell, and the
achievement of the perfect end to a good life...” (Dokecki 58). While it is true that the
institutional weight and reach of the Penn State football program pales in comparison to
the Catholic church, there is a great deal that the program itself can offer its fans.
Whether one is seeking a sense of pride, a feeling of belonging (many Penn Staters have
grown fond of saying they attend home football games with “110,000 of their closest
friends”), or even financial rewards, there are significant benefits that can be lost by
calling the behavior of an institution into question. In this sense, members of the State
College and Boston communities can not only be considered similar for the ideological
indoctrination they may have been subjected to (through ideological homogeneity) but
also for their consideration of the benefits offered to them by their institution. Thus, a
culture of silence is allowed to infect the general population of a community, not just its
most powerful members.

Masculinity and Power:

Another shared component of these scandals is the institutional marginalization of
non-normative sexuality. The homosexual nature of Sandusky’s assaults represented a
breach of hegemonic conceptions of masculinity in the world of football. This
“unacceptable” behavior contributed to vague reporting language and a public
elimination of the victims themselves. In the case of the Archdiocese of Boston, sexual
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assaults by clergymen also represented a deviation from institutional conceptions of
appropriate sexuality. The fact that a majority of the victims of individuals like Geoghan
were male (Rezendes 1) makes the scandal doubly abhorrent in terms of Catholic
doctrine (non-heteronormative and violation of celibacy). Thus, through their sexual
assault on male victims, priests of the Archdiocese of Boston portrayed imperfect
masculinity in a religious context, much like Sandusky had in a football setting. In her
volume on the issue of child abuse in the Catholic Church, Kennan outlines the
expectations of masculinity codified in the priesthood:
Perfect Celibate Clerical Masculinity is the form of masculinity
that is in the hegemonic position and promoted by the Catholic
Church as the ‘ideal’ type. It is a version of clerical masculinity in
which perfection is the goal and perfect celibacy and chastity is the
norm. Perfect Celibate Clerical Masculinity invites ways of living
premised on emotional, social, and sexual perfection. Human
transgressions and failure to achieve perfection are seen as
personal failures and sinful weakness (Keenan 244).
The role of celibacy in defining Clerical Masculinity above operates in the same way that
enthusiastic displays of heterosexuality do in an athletic setting (although thinly veiled
homosociality is also present). In both cases, hegemonic conceptions of acceptable
sexuality and masculinity exist to govern the behavior of community members. It is when
key figures within an institution fail to obey normalized conceptions of masculinity and
sexuality, as the two are intertwined, that institutional leaders often take it upon
themselves to remediate issues of deviance. Unfortunately, this remediation almost
always necessitates a cover-up, as handling the deviance internally will allow institutions
to maintain good standing in terms of public image.
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While the sexual deviance at the core of each of these scandals can be viewed as a
motivating factor for leaders’ concealment of criminal behavior, the issue of sexuality is
more complicated than this. In both cases, responses to allegations of sexual abuse had
the potential to condition public response to scandal by generating a shared discomfort in
naming the crimes committed by clergymen like Geoghan. Victim survivors of sexual
abuse perpetrated by officials of the Catholic Church around the globe often mention this
uneasiness in their parish communities following knowledge of their trauma being
circulated.31 One such member of the Church discussed this trend when recounting the
aftermath of their being abused, “Some people, though not many, avoided me. Not, I
think, because of indifference but because of their personal discomfort at the nature of
my transgression” (Heggen 141). In this way, discomfort with deviant behavior emerges
as a pattern across multiple instances of child abuse and can lead to ineffective responses
from community members in terms of addressing problematic and criminal behavior.

Responses to the Boston Scandal:

Responses to the child abuse scandal in the Archdiocese of Boston were
predominantly much different than those in Happy Valley following the Sandusky
scandal. In the Penn State case, many members of insider subgroups (fans, students, retail
shop owners) were shown going to great lengths to ignore Sandusky’s crimes and speak
out against groups they felt were out to get them. The general population of Catholics
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largely deviated from this response once they were informed of the crimes perpetrated by
their once-trusted clergymen. In particular, Catholics did not seem to engage in any
widespread denial as Penn State supporters had, nor did they attempt to appeal to an
inherent sense of morality that their institution possessed. That being said, certain
members of the Catholic church did partake in the familiar tactic of self-victimization
because of a feeling of institutional betrayal.
The Spotlight Team of The Boston Globe outlined a general feeling of outrage
amongst American Catholics following the news of the scandal in Boston:
For many, the clergy sexual abuse scandal was the final straw in
their relationship with the Church hierarchy, a relationship that had
been fraying for several generations as U.S. Catholics struggled to
balance their American values of democracy and egalitarianism
with their Catholic understanding of authority and clericalism.
Thousands had simply left the church...Those who formed
organizations to push for change were defined by Church leaders
as marginal, fringe, even non-Catholic (Spotlight Team 186).
This widespread movement away from a formerly trusted institution and push for
institutional reform32 is a pattern that initially distinguishes the response to the scandal in
the Archdiocese of Boston from the response to crisis at Penn State. The above quotation
also mentions that many Catholic Americans already had weakened religious devotion
prior to the sexual abuse. This element of a prior movement away from an institution
helping to position an instance of scandal as a “final straw” is absent in the Penn State

Harvard professor Mary Jo Bane helped to promote this sentiment in saying, “‘I will give no money to
the archdiocese until steps are taken to remedy structural and cultural flaws that created the current crisis, I
urge my fellow Catholics to do the same. Perhaps then the cardinal will pay attention to those of us who
love the Church, who grieve for what has happened to it, but who hope for what it can become’” (Spotlight
Team 185).
32
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case, as Nittany Lion fans were not wrestling with their willingness to identify with the
football program prior to the Sandusky scandal. The Penn State football program also did
not lose followers en masse after the Sandusky scandal. On the contrary, supporters of the
program actually became more vocally loyal to their Nittany Lions. In spite of this
distinction, American Catholics did engage in certain behavior we have grown to expect
from members of a group found in a crisis situation.
By breaking parish communities into focus groups and inquiring about their
feelings regarding child abuse in the Catholic Church, Paul Kline and his team found that,
“[f]our major themes were identified within the groups: (a) a deep hurt in response to
perceived betrayal by church leaders, (b) a reawakening of pain connected to past injuries
by clergy, (c) an effort to cope by separating relationship with God from relationship with
the church, and (d) a concern for the spiritual well-being of other family members”
(Kline et al 290). This style of response should look familiar, as members of these focus
groups responded to an institutional crisis by shifting focus to their role as victims. These
parishioners were concerned first and foremost with how they had been betrayed and
subsequently victimized by their religious leaders. In these types of responses, no concern
is expressed for the true victims (those assaulted in the Archdiocese of Boston) and,
therefore, the crime itself is indirectly buried or ignored by Catholic community
members. At Penn State, reactions of this nature took center stage, as students, fans, shop
owners, and other community members felt the need to comment upon their victimization
(for example, siege mentality, institutional betrayal, etc.).
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Aside from reaction of the general population of Catholic citizens, another
controversial response to the criminal activity in the Archdiocese of Boston came from
the Vatican. In an address to American Cardinals, Pope John Paul II promoted what was
widely received as a problematic stance on the issues at hand:
The abuse of the young is a grave symptom of a crisis affecting not
only the Church but society as a whole. It is a deep-seated crisis of
sexual morality, even of human relationships, and its prime victims
are the family and the young. In addressing the problem of abuse
with clarity and determination, the Church will help society to
understand and deal with the crisis in its midst. It must be
absolutely clear to the Catholic faithful, and to the wider
community, that Bishops and superiors are concerned, above all
else, with the spiritual good of souls. People need to know that
there is no place in the priesthood and religious life for those who
would harm the young. They must know that Bishops and priests
are totally committed to the fullness of Catholic truth on matters of
sexual morality, a truth as essential to the renewal of the priesthood
and the episcopate as it is to the renewal of marriage and family
life (John Paul II 1).
In this excerpt of his address to American Cardinals, Pope John Paul II uses specific
language to paint the Catholic Church in a positive light as well as reassert the Church’s
claim to proper definitions of morality. His address to American Cardinals does little to
acknowledge the crisis that had just been uncovered in Boston or its victims. Pope John
Paul II seems to use this address as a tool to direct public focus toward the positive
attributes of the Catholic Church. This apparent function of the address relates to strategic
comments made by insiders and leaders at Penn State and North Carolina. Consequently,
it functions as a vital component to any argument being made that the discourse
surrounding the child abuse scandal in the Archdiocese of Boston largely mirrored that at
PSU and UNC during the aftermath of each of their scandals.
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The reaction of Cardinal Seán Patrick O’Malley (the current Archbishop of
Boston) to the cinematic portrayal of the scandal that took place in his Archdiocese prior
to his tenure can also be analyzed as a compelling response to crisis. Following his
viewing of director Tom McCarthy’s Oscar winning Spotlight, O’Malley was quick to
praise the film, “By providing in-depth reporting on the history of the clergy sexual abuse
crisis, the media led the Church to acknowledge the crimes and sins of its personnel and
to begin to address its failings, the harm done to victims and their families and the needs
of survivors. In a democracy such as ours, journalism is essential to our way of life.”
(O’Malley 2016). O’Malley’s comment largely surprised the public, as few expected the
Cardinal to have such celebratory things to say about a film that is so critical of the
Catholic Church. By having such a positive perception of the film, Cardinal O’Malley
displayed his ability to engage in psychological splitting (separate himself from the
institution he identifies with so as not to internalize critiques of the Catholic Church) and
recognize the true victims of the scandal. As previous discussion has demonstrated,
members of other institutions (PSU or UNC) rarely responded so positively to reminders
of scandal surrounding their institution. Interestingly, the film, which producer, Michael
Sugar, hoped would give a voice to the victims of scandal that would “resonate all the
way to the Vatican,” was widely recognized as not anti-Catholic (Glatz 1). Therefore, the
Catholic community, including certain prominent clergymen, separated itself from the
Penn State and North Carolina communities for its ability to take proper ownership of
criminal activity and recognize true victims without being bogged down by frustration or
institutional allegiance (at least in the context of this particular film).
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While some responses to the child abuse scandal in the Archdiocese of Boston
were shown to deviate from trends outlined in the cases of Penn State and UNC, many of
the same strategies were employed by members of the Catholic Church as fans of Penn
State football or students at the University of North Carolina. Catholic parishioners took
part in typical instances of self-victimization and shifting of public attention away from
the true victims of the scandal. Pope John Paul II’s address to American Cardinals also
engaged in the latter of these discursive strategies in its attempts to assert the value of
practicing Catholicism all while reifying the Church’s grasp on morality. What made the
discourse surrounding the Boston scandal unique was the widespread recognition by
Church members and leaders that what happened in their Archdiocese was a tragedy that
could have been prevented. In speaking out against or leaving the church, or supporting
artistic production that served as a reminder of the scandal, the Catholic Church’s
constituent members were able to free themselves from the pattern of reactions put on
display at PSU and UNC. Doing so represented a widespread ability amongst the
Catholic community to not only hear critiques of their beloved institution but also
generate their own.

Conclusion: What is to be Done?

The striking similarities between responses to scandal in the Catholic Archdiocese
of Boston and at Penn State University help to exemplify the universality of group
dynamics and crisis responses discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. In either
case, individual identification with an institution allows for the widespread conditioning
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of member behavior (for example, groupthink, siege mentality, shifting of victimhood,
etc.). The distinction between the secular and sacred nature of these institutions invites
both a discussion of how religion and sports intertwine and also an understanding of the
cultural force of sports in American culture. The fact that fans of all sports attribute
quasi-religious significance to their teams is certainly something that contributes to the
resemblance of fan and parishioner response to scandal in some cases. In both the case of
religion and sport, individuals likely look to larger groups/institutions for benefits (for
example, eternal salvation or bragging rights) and a sense of belonging. These benefits,
(which lead individuals to invest large portions of their identities into an institution) are
what lead to such vehement protection of an institution on the part of its members,
whether that institution is a religious organization or a football team.
In an athletic setting, fans of big-time college sports have grown accustomed to
hearing about scandals surfacing at institutions like Penn State and North Carolina. The
echoes of scandal still ring in the ears of University of Miami and University of Michigan
fans. More recently, Rick Pitino’s Louisville men’s basketball program has come under
fire for major recruiting violations. 33 Also, Michigan State has gained national attention
not only for sexual assault allegations targeted at their football and men’s basketball
programs but also for its connection to Larry Nassar.34 This list of prestigious athletic

The University of Louisville men’s basketball program was forced to vacate 123 wins (including a 2013
National Championship Title) and return nearly $600,000 in revenue due to a sex-recruiting scandal.
According to Gary B. Graves of the Associated Press, strippers and prostitutes were hired for parties
attended by men’s basketball recruits in order to entice them to attend Louisville.
33

An ESPN “Outside the Lines” investigation has uncovered a culture of sexual assault cover-up and denial
at Michigan State University involving the men’s basketball and football programs. MSU has also been
34
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programs mired in scandal is far from complete, as many other programs have had moral
lapses sully their reputations. The prevalence of scandal in the world of big-time college
sports points to a toxic culture of denial, cover-up, and general acceptance of corruption
for the sake of money and prestige. Although blame for these scandals falls almost
entirely on the shoulders of high-profile “monsters” like Sandusky, Nassar, Crowder, and
Nyang’oro, the problem extends to more than just these vilified individuals. Fans,
students, administrators, and business executives, among others, should also be held
accountable for their implicit involvement in enabling academic fraud, sexual assault, and
other crimes. In other words, responsibility for scandal should not rest solely with those
mentioned in investigative reports.
The high frequency of corrupt behavior being undertaken by the leaders of large
groups and enabled by their constituent members demonstrated in this thesis ultimately
leads to two major questions: Why do we care about these issues and what can we
possibly do about them? The answer to the first question raised seems obvious, but is also
important. By reducing the number of occurrences like the PSU, UNC, or Catholic
Church scandals, fewer victims and victim survivors will have their lives irreparably
damaged by criminals who are largely only allowed to operate due to the cultural weight
of their institutions. It is nothing short of tragic when the amount of wins a coach is
recognized with or institutional reputation take precedence over the life of a young boy.
The remedy for our second question is certainly more complicated. While the

criticized for mishandling reports of sexual abuse directed at Larry Nassar, who served as a trainer for the
women’s gymnastics program (although he also sexually abused athletes in his role with USA Gymnastics).
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psychological and social dynamics discussed in this thesis serve as factors that condition
the behavior of individuals are powerful when they emerge, they are not unique to one
particular environment. Even as context changes from the world of sports to the realm of
the sacred, similarly widespread negative attitudes toward what group members see as
threatening “outsider” ideology can be discerned. In addition, the shifting of victimhood
and pervasiveness of denial manifest themselves in myriad institutional crisis scenarios.
These parallels can actually be leveraged by those looking to mitigate instances of
institutional corruption. More popularized identification of these nearly universal
dynamics at play could be the first step towards a solution. Simply by making more
individuals aware of these group dynamics, it may be more likely that these same people
are willing and able to take a step back from their institution and not allow identification
with a particular group to entirely govern their behavior. Individuals should never be
silenced for having opinions that do not fit into an institution’s normalized discourse.
Following from this potential for more common psychological splitting and identity
interrogation, group members can adopt more scrutinizing perspectives of their highstatus leaders. In sporting cases, popular or successful coaches and players should not
have the ability to overshadow the victims of scandal. These same individuals should also
not be exempt from common moral standards for their ability to bring prestige to an
institution or generate revenue for a community. In any other context, the leaders and
popular figures of an institution should not be treated as infallible. Although these are
two tasks that likely will not be able to be undertaken in all groups, the more common
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they become, the less often the public will be presented with information on scandals
that, sadly, no longer shocks anyone.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Dramatis Personae:
Gerald A. Sandusky - Former assistant coach of the Pennsylvania State University
football program under Joe Paterno. Sandusky coached the Nittany Lions from 1969 to
1999 and was twice recognized as the NCAA’s “Assistant Coach of the Year.” In 1977,
Sandusky founded The Second Mile non-profit organization in order to serve local at-risk
youth. Later in his life, Sandusky was convicted on various charges regarding his serial
sexual assault of young boys.

Graham B. Spanier - Served as the sixteenth President of Pennsylvania State University
(September 1, 1995 - November 9, 2011) before being forced to resign by the Penn State
Board of Trustees following Sandusky’s arrest.

Gary C. Schultz - Spent fourteen years as Pennsylvania State University Vice President
for Finance and Business before retiring in 2009. Once his successor left the university to
accept a new position, Schultz reclaimed his role at Penn State before resigning amid the
Sandusky scandal.
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Timothy M. Curley - Former Pennsylvania State University Athletic Director (active 1993
- 2013). Curley left PSU after the university elected not to rehire him once his contract
expired in 2013.

Joseph V. Paterno (December 21, 1926 - January 22, 2012) - Former Head Coach of the
Pennsylvania State University football program. Paterno served as the Nittany Lions’
Head Coach from 1966 to 2011. Before being dismissed by the PSU Board of Trustees in
November 2011, Paterno tallied 409 wins, giving him the most of any coach in NCAA
FBS history.

Louis J. Freeh - Served as the fifth Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(active 1993 - 2001). Freeh was commissioned by the Penn State Board of Trustees to
lead a team in an investigation of the role of the university and its administration’s
culture, policies, and practices in allowing Sandusky’s abuse to take place and go
unreported for years.

Mark A. Emmert - Currently serving as President and CEO of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association. Emmert was responsible for handing down sanctions for
Pennsylvania State University and its football program following the Sandusky scandal.
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Appendix B: Sample Merchandise Sold Following Scandal:

Fig. 5. Novelty t-shirt which reads, “National Communist Athletic Association Overstepping their bounds and punishing the innocent.” This shirt was sold in many
outlets in State College, including the popular local Student Book Store and evidences
direct attacks against perceived outsiders.

Fig. 6. Popularly sold t-shirt referencing Bill O’Brien, the successor to Joe Paterno at the
helm of Penn State’s football program.
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Fig. 7. References to Joe Paterno’s 409 career victories as a head coach could be seen all
over State College on shirts, bumper stickers, and other merchandise. This design became
popular following the NCAA’s decision to vacate a significant portion of Paterno’s
victories.

Fig. 8. Designs such as this also became popular following the Sandusky scandal.
Essentially, expressing pride in Penn State University became very “trendy” once
outsiders began to attack the university. Mention of fans “still” being proud even after the
scandal was also seen frequently on their shirts.
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Appendix C: Sample Cartoons Published Pertaining to Scandal:

Fig. 9. Untitled Cartoon by Rob Tornoe (2012)

Fig. 10. Pope JoePa by Rob Rogers (November 10, 2011)
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Fig. 11. Wait, JoePa Was Fired? by Charley Gifford (November 13, 2011)

Fig. 12. Untitled Cartoon posted on SC6 “Cartoons of the Week” by Mark Reino (July
15, 2012)
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Fig. 13. Paterno Statue by Rob Rogers (May 12, 2014)

Fig. 14. Paterno fumbles moral obligation by Jeff Darcy (November 12, 2011)
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Fig. 15. Jerry Sandusky horsing around by Jeff Darcy (November 18, 2011)

Fig. 16. Penn State penalty severity by Jeff Darcy (July 25, 2012)

